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ABSTRACT 
Neuroeconomics has produced a number of insights into economics, psychology, and 
neuroscience in its relatively short existence. Here, I show how neuroeconomics can inform 
these fields through three studies in social decision making and decision making under risk. 
Specifically, I focus on computational biases inherent in our daily decisions. 
 
First, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), I examine how we make 
decisions for others compared to ourselves. I find that overlapping areas of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) are involved in both types of decisions, though 
decisions for others are modulated by areas involved in social cognition. Specifically, 
activity in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) encodes a variable measuring the distance 
between others’ and our own preferences, suggesting that we may anchor our choices for 
others on our own preferences and attempt to modulate these preferences with what we 
know about others. 
 
Second, I investigate how visual looking patterns can critically influence the computation 
and comparison of values. In a first study using eye-tracking, I investigate the relationship 
between loss aversion and attention and find a correlation between how loss averse subjects 
are and how long they look at losses vs. gains when evaluating mixed gambles. 
Importantly, I show that this effect is not due to subjects simply looking longer at items of 
higher value. In a second study using Mouselab, I show how attention influences multi-
 vii 
attribute choice. I find that the display of different attributes has a significant effect on 
search among those attributes and, ultimately, choice. 
 
 
  
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ iii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... vi 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................. viii 
Summary ............................................................................................................ 10 
 
Chapter I: Empathic Choice Involves vmPFC Value Signals that are Modulated  
by Social Processing Implemented in IPL ........................................................ 13 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 14 
Methods ....................................................................................................... 18 
Results ......................................................................................................... 27 
Discussion ................................................................................................... 44 
References ................................................................................................... 47 
Appendix ..................................................................................................... 53 
 
Chapter II: Variation in Loss Aversion is Associated with Differential Attention 
to Losses ............................................................................................................ 67 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 68 
Methods ....................................................................................................... 71 
Results ......................................................................................................... 76 
Discussion ................................................................................................... 87 
  
ix 
References ................................................................................................... 91 
Appendix ..................................................................................................... 96 
 
Chapter III: Display and Search Dynamics in Multi-Attribute Choice .......... 103 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 105 
Methods ..................................................................................................... 109 
Results ....................................................................................................... 120 
Discussion ................................................................................................. 137 
References ................................................................................................. 139 
Appendix ................................................................................................... 143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
10 
SUMMARY 
In recent years, the field of neuroeconomics has shed insight on a number of traditional 
economics questions. While neuroscience has benefited from the collaboration with 
economics, there is still disagreement about the degree to which neuroscience can inform 
economics. In this thesis, I conduct three experiments to show how neuroeconomics can 
help address questions that remain unanswered with traditional economic methods. 
 
In Chapter 1 I use fMRI to show how we make decisions for others compared to 
ourselves.  Every day we make decisions on behalf of others, whether it is for a friend, a 
patient, a client, a coworker or a constituent. I investigate the neurobiological and 
computational basis of empathic choice using a human fMRI task in which subjects 
purchase items for themselves with their own money, or for others with the other’s money. 
I find that empathic choices on behalf of others engage the same regions of the brain, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), that are known to compute stimulus values when 
making choices for ourselves. During empathic choice, these value signals are modulated 
by activity in another brain region, the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), which has previously 
been found to play a role in social processes. These findings extend our understanding of 
social cognition and have broader implications for psychology and economics. The results 
suggest that the ability to make sound empathic decisions might depend on the ability to 
compute value signals in vmPFC that give sufficient weight to the differences between 
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others and ourselves. It follows that deficits in empathy and general social cognition 
might impair the ability to make sound empathic decisions, which could interfere with 
everyday social interaction. 
 
In Chapter 2 I use eye-tracking to investigate the role of attention in loss aversion. While 
there is much evidence showing that individuals exhibit loss aversion in many domains, 
the mechanisms behind loss aversion remain unknown. Based on recent research showing 
that differences in attention affect the computation and comparison of values during 
simple choice, I hypothesize that differences in loss aversion across and within 
individuals could be modulated by differential attention to losses. I find that more loss 
averse subjects pay more relative attention to losses, and my results suggest a model in 
which attention must be included to make any inferences on choice. My results have 
important implications for the role of attentional processes in choice: systematic biases in 
fixations could lead to different choices. Moreover, as biases such as loss aversion can 
lead to deficits in decision-making, our findings raise the interesting possibility that we 
may be able to modulate our attention to make better choices. 
 
In Chapter 3 I further examine the role of attention, and the computational biases it 
introduces, in choice. Using a two-item, two-attribute choice task, I examine how 
consumers might quickly parse and select among a variety of options. I find striking 
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differences in search patterns depending on how attributes of each choice are visually 
arranged. These search patterns subsequently impact choice through the differential 
weighting and integration of the attributes. Higher-placed attributes for a given item will 
receive more attention and thus greater weighting in an overall value for the item. My 
results have important implications for a number of applications, including store display 
arrangement, product attribute emphasis and the organization of features on a website.  
 
These three experiments show how neuroeconomics can help address questions that remain 
unanswered with traditional economics methods. These findings extend our understanding 
of social cognition and further our knowledge of how we assess potential outcomes in risky 
and complex choice situations. These results shed light on the role that computational 
biases play in decision-making and how we might be able to modulate such biases to 
improve our choices.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Empathic Choice Involves vmPFC Value Signals that are Modulated 
by Social Processing Implemented in IPL 
 
Abstract. Empathic decision-making involves making choices on behalf of others in 
order to maximize their well-being. Examples include the choices that parents make for 
their children, as well as the decisions of a politician trying to make good choices on behalf 
of his constituency. We investigated the neurobiological and computational basis of 
empathic choice using a human fMRI task in which subjects purchased DVDs for 
themselves with their own money, or DVDs for others with the other’s money. We found 
that empathic choices engage the same regions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex that are 
known to compute stimulus values, and that these value signals were modulated by activity 
from a region of inferior parietal lobule (IPL) known to play a critical role in social 
processes such as empathy. We also found that the stimulus value signals used to make 
empathic choices were computed using a mixture of self-simulation and other-simulation 
processes, and that activity in IPL encoded a variable measuring the distance between the 
other’s and own preferences, which provides a hint for how the mixture of self- and other-
simulation might be implemented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans make different types of decisions. Self-oriented decisions mostly affect ourselves 
and are guided by the goal of maximizing our own well-being. Examples include what to 
have for lunch or which clothing to purchase. Pro-social decisions involve tradeoffs 
between our own well-being and the well-being of others. Examples include a donation to 
charity and purchasing a gift for a friend. Empathic decisions entail decisions made on 
behalf of other people, with the goal of choosing what is best for them, and without having 
to sacrifice our own resources. Examples include the myriad of choices that parents make 
for their children, the decisions of a politician trying to make good choices on behalf of his 
or her constituents, and economic agents (e.g., in real estate or entertainment) who strive to 
commit their clients’ time and money to activities the clients prefer. Although a substantial 
amount of progress has been made in understanding self-oriented (Rangel, Camerer et al. 
2008; Rushworth and Behrens 2008; Kable and Glimcher 2009; Rangel and Hare 2010) 
and pro-social decisions (Fehr and Camerer 2007), much less is known about the 
computational and neurobiological basis of empathic choice. 
 
From a psychological and neurobiological perspective, empathic choice is particularly 
interesting because it is likely to involve the interaction of two different types of processes: 
those involved in basic decision-making, such as value computation and comparison, and 
those involved in social processing, such as empathy and mentalizing. 
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With respect to basic decision-making, a large body of work has begun to characterize in 
detail the computations involved in self-oriented decisions. For example, human 
neuroimaging studies have shown that activity in areas such as ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) correlates with the value of stimuli at the time of choice (Kable and 
Glimcher 2007; Plassmann, O'Doherty et al. 2007; Tom, Fox et al. 2007; Valentin, 
Dickinson et al. 2007; Hare, O'Doherty et al. 2008; Plassmann, O'Doherty et al. 2008; 
Rolls, McCabe et al. 2008; Boorman, Behrens et al. 2009; FitzGerald, Seymour et al. 2009; 
Hare, Camerer et al. 2009; Hare, Camerer et al. 2009; Litt, Plassmann et al. 2009). Similar 
results have been found in non-human primate electrophysiology studies (Wallis and Miller 
2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2008; Kennerley, 
Dahmubed et al. 2009; Kennerley and Wallis 2009; Padoa-Schioppa 2009).  Activity in 
vmPFC has also been associated with the computation of stimulus values during pro-social 
choices (Moll, Krueger et al. 2006; Harbaugh, Mayr et al. 2007; Tankersley, Stowe et al. 
2007; Hsu, Anen et al. 2008; Hare, Camerer et al. 2010; Tricomi, Rangel et al. 2010). 
Importantly, however, none of these previous studies include instances of empathic choice. 
 
With respect to social processing, a separate body of work has begun to characterize the 
computations involved in social cognition. Empathy is normally defined as the ability to 
appreciate the emotions and feelings of others as separate from those of the self (Decety 
2010; Shamay-Tsoory 2011). A significant number of studies, using a wide variety of 
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paradigms, have shown that areas such as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL), and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) play a critical role in 
empathy computations (Mitchell 2009; Zaki, Weber et al. 2009; Decety 2010; Shamay-
Tsoory 2011). Importantly, the previous literature on empathy has also not covered the case 
of empathic choice, since the tasks used involved the observation and evaluation of other’s 
emotional states, but not decision-making on their behalf. A related literature has studied 
the neurobiological basis of mentalizing (often called theory of mind, ToM), and has found 
that areas such as medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 
play a critical role in this process (Saxe and Kanswisher 2003; Mitchell, Banaji et al. 2005; 
Saxe and Wexler 2005; Mitchell, Macrae et al. 2006; Saxe 2006; Mitchell 2009). 
 
Here we present the results of a simple human functional magnetic resonance imaging 
study (fMRI) in which subjects made otherwise identical decisions (purchasing DVDs) in 
either a self-oriented context, by buying them for themselves with their own funds, or in an 
empathic context, by buying them for an unknown third party, with this party’s funds. This 
allowed us to investigate two basic questions regarding empathic decision-making.  
 
First, is the same basic neural circuitry involved in making self-oriented and empathic 
decisions? And, if not, what are the critical differences? Based on the decision and social 
neuroscience literatures discussed above, we hypothesized that empathic decisions engage 
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the basic elements of the decision making system, such as the computation of stimulus 
value signals in vmPFC, but that their computation during empathic choice requires the 
activation of regions, such as IPL and TPJ, that are known to play a critical role in empathy 
and mentalizing. 
 
Second, what are the computational properties of the stimulus values used to make 
empathic choices? In particular, we were interested in disentangling the extent to which 
subjects computed the empathic stimulus value signals using self-simulation, other-
simulation, or other-learning. Under self-simulation, subjects infer the other’s DVD values 
by computing their own value for them. Under other-simulation, subjects use some model 
of the other individual to infer his value for the DVDs but make no use of their own 
preferences for them. Under other-learning, subjects learn to compute the other’s DVD 
values by repeatedly observing their behavior. Conceptually there is an important 
difference between the last two approaches: other-simulation requires forming a social 
model of the other person (e.g., gender, nationality, age, etc.), whereas under other-
learning, the other’s preferences are learned simply by repeated observation and 
extrapolation. Thus, the other-simulation approach makes heavy use of social models and 
information, whereas other-learning involves much more basic forms of learning. 
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METHODS 
 
Subjects. 32 normal-weight, American or Canadian, male subjects participated in the 
experiment (age: mean = 22.8, SD = 3.9). All subjects were right-handed, healthy, had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had no history of neurological or metabolic illnesses, 
and were not taking any medication that interferes with the performance of fMRI. All 
subjects were informed about the experiment and gave written consent before participating. 
 
Stimuli. Subjects viewed 100 high-resolution color images of DVD covers of popular films 
from the last 15 years. They included comedies (e.g., “Austin Powers”), action films (e.g., 
“Swordfish”), dramas (e.g., “Magnolia”) and thrillers (e.g., “Panic Room”).  
 
Task. There were two types of subjects in the experiment: one passive subject and thirty-
two active subjects. The role of the passive subject was to be the recipient of the active 
subjects’ decisions. 
 
Active subjects made decisions inside the scanner in two types of trials performed on 
different days (average lag = 90 days). On the first visit they participated in an empathic 
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choice task in which they made purchase decisions on behalf of the passive subject (Fig. 
1A). They were given a budget of $10 that belonged to the passive subject (any unspent 
funds were returned to him) and were given a summary sheet containing a photograph and 
some biographic information about the passive subject (see Appendix for detailed 
instructions). They were then shown images of 100 different DVDs and had to make a 
decision regarding how much to bid for each one of them on behalf of the subject. Bids 
were made using a six-point scale of $0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10. After every bid subjects received 
feedback equal to the amount by which they had overbid or underbid relative to the passive 
subject’s values (feedback = active subject’s bid – passive subject’s bid). Active subjects 
did not receive any form of compensation for making accurate bids. Instead, the 
instructions simply told them to try to maximize the passive subject’s well-being. The 
mapping of bids to response buttons was counterbalanced across subjects. 
  
At the conclusion of the experiment, one of the 100 trials was randomly selected and 
implemented using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction. The rules of the auction 
are as follows. Let b denote the bid made by the subject for a particular item. After the bid 
is made, a random number n is drawn from a known distribution (in our case, each integer 
dollar value from $0 to $10 was chosen with equal probability). If b >= n, the subject 
received the DVD and paid a price equal to n. Otherwise, if b < n, the subject did not get 
the DVD and did not pay anything. The optimal strategy in this type of auction is for the 
buyer to bid exactly how much he is willing to pay for the item being sold (Becker, 
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DeGroot et al. 1964).  The active subjects knew that the outcome of the auction would be 
implemented, and that the person for whom they were bidding would receive any DVD 
purchased plus any remaining cash from the $10. Note that since only one trial was 
selected to count, the subjects did not have to worry about spreading the $10 dollars across 
the different films, and could treat every decision as if it were the only one. No deception 
was used in the experiment. The passive subject actually received DVDs when the 
subject’s decision led to a purchase of the DVD.  
 
During the second day of scanning, active subjects participated in the self-oriented version 
of the task (Fig. 1B). In this case they performed a similar task, except that now they made 
purchase decisions for themselves out of a $10 cash endowment that belonged to them. A 
randomly selected trial was again chosen, and the associated decision implemented, at the 
conclusion of the two sessions. At the end of the second session, subjects were asked to fill 
out a questionnaire detailing which DVDs they owned or had seen. In order to control for 
any potential order effects on bidding, the DVDs were shown in the same order as in the 
first experimental visit.  
 
The passive subject played only the bid-for-self task outside the scanner. His responses 
were used to compute the feedback signals for the active subjects.  
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Fig. 1.  Behavioral task for (A) empathic choice trials and (B) self-oriented choice trials. 
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About task order. Given the difficulty in guessing another’s film preferences, we were 
concerned that subjects would exhibit an artificial tendency to use their own preferences to 
make the purchase decisions for the other. In order to minimize this concern, we decided 
not to counterbalance the order of the two tasks, and to introduce a long multi-month lag 
between them. The results described below suggest that we were successful in avoiding a 
full self-valuation bias during the empathic decisions. However, this raises the natural 
concern of order confounds. To address this concern we carried out a companion 
behavioral experiment (see SOMs for details) in which we directly compared the effect of 
order on bidding behavior. For each individual we carried out a linear regression of bid-for-
other on bid-for-self and other-bid, separately for self-oriented and empathic choice trials. 
We found no significant differences across the two order conditions (min p=0.29, t-test), 
which rules out the order confound. 
 
fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing. The fMRI data were acquired in a 3.0 Tesla 
Trio MRI Scanner (Siemens). We acquired gradient echo T2-weighted echoplanar (EPI) 
images with a BOLD contrast in an oblique orientation of 30 degrees to the anterior 
commissure-posterior commissure line. We also used an eight-channel phased array head 
coil. Each volume of images had 48 axial slices of 3 mm thickness and 3 mm in-plane 
resolution with a TR of 3 s. The imaging data were acquired in four separate sessions; the 
first two, in which subjects bid on behalf of the passive subject, lasted approximately 13 
minutes each. The latter two, in which subjects bid for themselves, lasted approximately 9 
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minutes each. The first two sessions were performed on a separate date than the latter 
two sessions. Whole-brain high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1 x 1 x 1 mm) 
were acquired for each subject and coregistered to their mean functional EPI images. The 
structural scans were averaged across subjects to permit anatomical localization of the 
functional activations at the group level. 
 
Image analysis was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM5; 
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). We 
preprocessed the data in the following way. First, slice-timing correction centered at the 
middle T2 scan was applied, followed by realignment to the first volume. We then applied 
spatial normalization to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI template 
with a resampled voxel size of 3 mm2 and performed spatial smoothing using a Gaussian 
kernel with full width at half maximum of 8 mm. Intensity normalization and high-pass 
temporal filtering were also applied to the data.  
 
fMRI data analysis. We estimated several models of the BOLD responses to test the 
various hypotheses. 
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GLM 1. This general linear model was designed to identify the similarities and 
differences between empathic and self-oriented choices. It was estimated in three different 
steps.  
 
First, we estimated a GLM with AR(1) for each individual subject. The model contained 
the following regressors: R1) indicator function (equal to 1 when the event occurs and 0 
otherwise) for bid-for-other screen; R2) indicator function for bid-for-other screen 
modulated by bid-for-other; R3) indicator function for bid-for-other screen modulated by 
the absolute value of the difference between bid-for-self and bid-for-other; R4) indicator 
function for feedback screen; R5) indicator function for feedback screen modulated by the 
negative absolute value of the feedback error; R6) indicator function for bid-for-self screen; 
R7) indicator function for bid-for-self screen modulated by bid-for-self. All regressors were 
modeled as box-car functions with a duration equal to the subject’s reaction time for that 
trial, except for regressors 4 and 5, which had a duration of 1 second. These regressors 
were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response. The model also included motion 
parameters and session constants as regressors of no interest. Trials with missed responses 
were not modeled. Second, we computed contrast statistics for all of the tests of interest for 
each individual subject. Third, we estimated second-level test statistics by computing one-
sample t-tests on the single subject contrast coefficients for each contrast of interest.  
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For inference purposes, all results are reported at p < 0.05 whole brain corrected at the 
cluster level (using the corrected cluster size threshold algorithm by Thomas Nichols; 
http://www.sph.umich.edu/~nichols/JohnsGems5.html). The only exception is activity in 
the vmPFC for which, due to the strong prior hypotheses, we report activity at p<0.05 small 
volume cluster corrected (using an anatomical mask of the vmPFC area that included both 
sides of the medial orbitofrontal cortex and the rectus gyrus).  
 
GLM 2. This model was very similar to GLM 1, except that activity at decision during 
empathic choices was modulated by two variables: bid-for-self and bid-for-other 
orthogonalized with respect to bid-for-self. All omitted details are as in GLM 1. 
 
GLM 3. This model was very similar to GLM 1, except that activity at decision during 
empathic choices was modulated by two variables: bid-for-other and bid-for-self 
orthogonalized with respect to bid-for-other. All omitted details are as in GLM 1. 
 
GLM 4. This model was very similar to GLM 1, except that activity at decision during 
empathic choices was modulated by two variables: bid-for-self and a difference signal 
(given by bid-for-other MINUS bid-for-self). All omitted details are as in GLM 1. 
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Psychophysiological interactions model (PPI). The goal of this analysis was to identify 
areas exhibiting differential connectivity with vmPFC during empathic and self-oriented 
choices. The model was estimated in the following steps.  
 
First, we extracted individual average time-series of BOLD activity within an individually 
defined region of vmPFC, given by a 4mm sphere surrounding each individual’s peak 
activation for the contrast ‘R2 MINUS baseline’ in GLM-1 within the anatomical mask of 
the vmPFC shown in Fig. 1C. We removed any variance from this time series associated 
with the motion regressors. The resulting time courses were deconvolved using standard 
procedures (Gitelman, Penny et al. 2003).  
 
Second, we estimated a whole-brain GLM of BOLD responses with AR(1) and the 
following regressors: R1) interaction between the vmPFC deconvolved time series and an 
indicator function for bid-for-other screen;  R2) interaction between the vmPFC 
deconvolved time series and an indicator function for bid-for-self screen; R3) indicator 
function for bid-for-other screen; R4) indicator function for bid-for-self screen; R5) the 
vmPFC deconvolved time series. These regressors were convolved with a canonical 
hemodynamic response. The model also included motion parameters and session constants 
as regressors of no interest. Note that Regressor 1 identifies areas exhibiting task-related 
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functional connectivity with the vmPFC seed region during empathic choices. Regressor 
2 does the same for self-oriented choices. 
 
Third, we calculated the following single subject contrasts: C1) Regressor 1 vs. baseline, 
C2) Regressor 2 vs. baseline, and C3) Regressor 1 vs. Regressor 2.  
 
Fourth, we conducted a second level analysis by calculating a one-sample t-test on the 
single subject contrast coefficients.  
 
RESULTS 
 
First we discuss tests designed to investigate if the same basic neural circuitry is involved 
in making self-oriented and empathic decisions, and to characterize the key differences. 
 
Longer RTs in empathic choice. Mean reaction times when bidding for self were about 500 
ms faster than when bidding for other (self: mean = 2.16 s, SD = 0.52; other: mean = 2.67 
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s, SD = 0.47; paired t-test p < 0.05). This is consistent with the hypothesis that empathic 
decisions involve the deployment of extra processes. 
 
Common value coding in vmPFC. We hypothesized that a common area of vmPFC is 
involved in computing the stimulus values (SVs) assigned to DVDs at the time of decision 
in both the self-oriented and empathic trials. We focused our attention on vmPFC because a 
large number of studies have found SV signals in this area (see introduction). The bids-for-
self provide a trial-by-trial measure of the SVs computed in self-oriented trials, whereas the 
bids-for-other provide a similar measure for empathic decisions.  
 
We tested this hypothesis by estimating a general linear model of BOLD responses (GLM 
1) that looked for correlations between the magnitude of the bids placed in each condition 
and BOLD activity (see Methods for details). Activity in vmPFC correlated with the bids-
for-other during empathic choices (Fig. 2A, see Table 1 for a complete list of activations). 
Activity in the same area of vmPFC also correlated with bids-for-self during self-oriented 
choices (Fig. 2B, see Table 2 for a complete list of activations). A conjunction analysis 
showed that activity in a common area of vmPFC correlated with SVs in both conditions 
(Fig. 2C), as did activity in areas of the precuneus, middle frontal gyrus, and inferior 
parietal lobule (Fig. S3). 
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We also looked for differences in the strength of SV coding across the empathic and self-
oriented conditions. We carried out this test in two ways. First, using a whole brain analysis 
and our omnibus threshold, we did not find any regions that exhibited stronger responsivity 
to bid-for-self during self-oriented choice than to bid-for-other during empathic choices at 
our omnibus threshold. Second, we carried an unbiased region-of-interest (ROI) analysis in 
the area of vmPFC that correlates with SVs in both conditions. A comparison of the 
average beta values within the ROI for the bid-for-self and bid-for-other regressors 
revealed no significant differences (p=0.26, paired t-test). 
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Fig. 2.  A) Activity in vmPFC correlated with the bids-for-other during empathic choices (p < 
0.05, SVC). B) Activity in vmPFC also correlated with the bids-for-self during self-oriented choices 
(p < 0.05, SVC). C) Conjunction analysis: activity in a common area of vmPFC correlated with the 
bids placed in both empathic and self-oriented choice trials.  
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Table 1. Areas exhibiting a positive correlation with bid-for-other 
during empathic choice (GLM 1) 
    
     Region Side k T MNI coordinates 
        x     y     z 
 
  
   Ventral striatum L/R 153 5.39 -9    6    -6 
Middle frontal gyrus L 248 4.85 -27  33  -15 
Precuneus / Inferior parietal lobule L 255 4.78 -39 -57  42 
Fusiform / Middle occipital gyrus R 632 4.52 30  -66   0 
Posterior cingulate L 240 4.50 -6   -42  15 
vmPFC* L 21 3.57 -9   42  -15 
          
Height threshold: T = 2.74, p < 0.05, whole brain cluster corrected. 
Extent threshold: k = 109 voxels, p < 0.005. 
   *Survives small volume correction at p < 0.05. 
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Table 2. Areas exhibiting a positive correlation with bid-for-self 
during self-oriented choice (GLM 1) 
   
     Region Side k T MNI coordinates 
        x     y     z 
 
  
   Inferior parietal lobule L 295 4.47 -45 -36  39 
Middle frontal gyrus L 617 4.43 -39  36  12 
Precuneus L 135 4.07 -39 -72  30 
vmPFC* L/R 105 3.79 -6   27  -12 
          
Height threshold: T = 2.74, p < 0.05, whole brain cluster corrected. 
Extent threshold: k = 105 voxels, p < 0.005. 
  *Survives small volume correction at p < 0.05. 
   
  
33 
Differences in the network involved in empathic vs. self-oriented choices. We also 
hypothesized that empathic choice would require the activation of additional regions, such 
as IPL and TPJ, that are known to be involved in social cognition. We tested this 
hypothesis in two steps. 
 
First, using GLM 1, we looked for regions that exhibit higher average activity during 
empathic choices, and areas that exhibit higher average activity during self-oriented 
choices. A large cluster of regions exhibited stronger activity during empathic choices, 
including bilateral inferior parietal lobule, bilateral middle frontal gyri, bilateral anterior 
insula (Fig. S4A, Table 3).   We also found regions exhibiting stronger activity during self-
oriented choices, including bilateral supramarginal gyri, middle temporal gyrus, right 
posterior insula and superior temporal gyrus (Fig. S4B, Table 3). 
 
Second, we looked for differences in functional connectivity with the vmPFC valuation 
area between the empathic and self-oriented trials. We did this by estimating a 
psychophysiological interactions model that looks for areas that exhibit increases in 
functional connectivity at the time of decision separately in self-oriented and empathic 
trials. The model uses as a seed the area of vmPFC involved in SV coding in both 
conditions (see Methods for details). We found that activity in bilateral IPL exhibited 
stronger functional connectivity with vmPFC during empathic choices (Table 4, Fig. 3A). 
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In contrast, no regions exhibited stronger functional connectivity with vmPFC during 
self-oriented choices at our omnibus threshold. Interestingly, the regions of IPL that 
exhibit stronger functional connectivity with vmPFC overlap with those that exhibit 
stronger average activity during empathic trials (Fig. 3B). 
 
Together, these results provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that empathic 
choice engages the basic vmPFC valuation system, just as it does in self-oriented choice, 
but that the computation of these value signals in empathic choice involves the activation 
of regions of IPL that are known to play a critical role in social cognition. 
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Fig. 3. A) Areas of IPL exhibiting stronger connectivity with the vmPFC valuation region 
during empathic choices than during self-oriented decisions. B) Region of IPL exhibiting both 
stronger functional connectivity with vmPFC and higher average (unmodulated) activity during 
empathic choices. C) Region of IPL exhibiting both stronger functional connectivity with vmPFC 
during empathic choices and a correlation with the difference preference measure. The contrasts are 
thresholded at p<.05, WBC. 
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in self-oriented vs. empathic choice (GLM 1)
Region Side k T MNI coordinates
x     y     z
Self-oriented > Empathic
Inf parietal/Supramarginal gyrus L 471 12.6 -51  -54   36
Inf parietal/Supramarginal gyrus R 409 7.06 51   -57   42
Middle temporal gyrus L 149 5.71 -63  -33   -9
Middle temporal gyrus R 165 5.44 57   -27   -24
Cingulate gyrus L 173 5.16 -9   -18    27
Middle frontal gyrus R 218 4.71 39   12    57
Insula/Superior temporal gyrus R 167 4.38 48   -6      0
Empathic > Self-oriented
Middle occipital gyrus/cuneus L 11460 -8.90 -24  -90    3
  Putamen/caudate/thalamus L * -8.63 -6   9      -3
  Middle occipital gyrus/cuneus R * -7.94 3     -93    9
  Putamen/caudate/thalamus R * -7.20 18  -27     3
  Inf parietal lobe/Postcentral gyrus R * -7.07 36  -27    69
  Precentral/middle frontal gyrus L * -7.04 -18 -75   51
  Fusiform/middle temporal gyrus L * -6.51 -39 -63  -18
  Insula/Inf frontal gyrus L * -6.23 -36  33    6
  Midbrain L * -6.16 -18 -24   -3
  Precentral/middle frontal gyrus R * -5.45 15  -72   54
  Midbrain R * -5.36 18  -24    3
  Inf parietal lobe L * -5.13 -27  -30  75
Insula/Inf frontal gyrus R 180 -5.04 45   21     3
*Part of a larger cluster.
Table 3. Regions exhibiting stronger average (unmodulated) activation
Height threshold: T = 2.74, p < 0.05, whole brain cluster corrected.
Extent threshold: k = 112 voxels, p < 0.005.
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Table 4. Areas exhibiting positive task related functional connectivity with the vmPFC  
(PPI analysis)
Region Side k T MNI coordinates
x     y     z
Self-oriented
Inferior frontal gyrus R 164 4.1 45   9     6
Supramarginal/sup temporal gyrus R 169 4.3 66  -24  36
Inferior parietal lobe L 142 3.9 -30  -57  60
Inferior parietal lobe R 134 4.7 45  -39   66
Empathic
Middle frontal gyrus R 2383 6.0 45   45  15
Insula/Inferior frontal gyrus L 354 4.5 -36  18   -3
Middle frontal gyrus L 493 5.3 -39  33   39
Inferior parietal lobe L 2727 7.1 -42  -48  42
  Inferior parietal lobe R * 6.9 48   -45  54
Empathic > Self-oriented
Inferior parietal lobe L 145 5.1 -36  -45   42
Inferior parietal lobe R 148 3.9 48   -48   57
Height threshold: T = 2.58, p < 0.05, whole brain cluster corrected.
Extent threshold: k = 102 voxels, p < 0.005.
*Part of a larger cluster.
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Next, we investigated the extent to which stimulus value signals are computed using self-
simulation, other-simulation, or other-learning, during empathic choices. 
 
No behavioral evidence for other-learning. Under other-learning, the quality of bids-for-
other should improve over time. A good measure of the quality of the individual’s bids-for-
other is given by  
 
correlation(bid-for-other, other-bid) – correlation(bid-for-self, other-bid) (1). 
 
The first term measures the extent to which the subject’s bids-for-other correlates with the 
other’s preferences. The second term corrects for the fact that the first term might be 
artificially large if both individuals tend to like the same movies. The mean quality statistic 
was 0.06 (S.E.= 0.017, p<.0001, t-test). Contrary to the other-learning model, we found no 
significant difference between the first and second half of trials (p=0.72, pairwise t-test), 
which provides evidence against other-learning. 
 
Behavioral bids are consistent with a mixture of self- and other-simulation. A comparison 
of the differences between the bids that the subjects made for themselves (during self-
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oriented choice) and those that they made for the other (during empathic choice) 
provides a behavioral test of the extent to which the stimulus values were consistent with 
the self- versus the other-simulation models. The self-simulation model predicts a very high 
correlation between the bids-for-self and the bids-for-other. In contrast, the other-
simulation model predicts a much lower correlation between the two types of bids.  
 
One critical difficulty in carrying out this test is that, regardless of how the bids are 
computed, they may be correlated because individual preferences are not independent (for 
example, no one seems to like certain movies). This problem can be circumvented through 
the following two steps. 
 
First, we estimated a mixed effects linear regression of bid-for-other on two regressors: 
other-bid and bid-for-self. Importantly, the bid-for-self regressor was orthogonalized with 
respect to the other-bid. This is important because, then, any variation on bid-for-other that 
is explained by the bid-for-self regressor cannot be attributed to common preferences. As a 
result, the relative magnitude of the bid-for-self regressor provides a lower bound on the 
contribution of self-simulation processes. Both coefficients were statistically significant 
and of approximately equal magnitude  (other-bid: mean=.52, SE=.02, p<.0001; bid-for-
self: mean=0.55, SE=0.03, p<.0001; t-tests). 
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Second, we estimated a related regression in which the independent variable was still 
bid-for-other, but the right-hand-side regressors were bid-for-self and other-bid 
orthogonalized with respect to bid-for-self. This alternative orthogonalization is useful 
because now the relative magnitude of the other-bid regression coefficient provides a lower 
bound on the contribution of other-simulation processes. Both coefficients were again 
statistically significant (other-bid: mean=.24, SE=.018, p<.0001; bid-for-self: mean=0.81, 
SE=0.03, p<.0001; t-tests). 
 
Together with the previous result, the two regressions suggest that subjects computed 
stimulus values during empathic trials using a mixture of self-simulation and other-
simulation processes. The relative magnitude of the regressors also suggests that the self-
simulation component played a stronger role in our task. 
 
Activity in vmPFC is also consistent with a mixture of self- and other-simulation. We also 
investigated the extent to which the stimulus value signals computed during empathic 
choices were consistent with self- or other-simulation. We did this by estimating two new 
GLMs of BOLD responses. The key difference with the previous models is that activity 
during empathic choices was now modulated by two variables: bid-for-self and bid-for-
other. Importantly, to deal with the problem of preference correlation discussed above, in 
  
41 
GLM 2 the bid-for-other was orthogonalized with respect to the bid-for-self, and in GLM 
3 the opposite orthogonalization was carried out.  
 
We computed the average regression coefficients for bid-for-self and bid-for-other in both 
models within the vmPFC region that correlates with stimulus values in both empathic and 
self-oriented choice.  We found that all regressors were significantly positive (p<.0001 in 
all cases, t-test). For completeness, we carried out similar ROI tests in all of the areas that 
correlated with stimulus values in either empathic or self-oriented choices and found 
similar results. 
 
These results provide further neurobiological evidence that stimulus values during 
empathic choice are computed using a mixture of the self- and other-simulation processes. 
 
We also carried out an additional post-hoc analysis designed to explore the computational 
role that IPL might play in empathic choice. Based on the results described above, as well 
as the literature discussed in the introduction, we speculated that IPL might contribute to 
the computation of stimulus values by measuring the extent to which the other’s 
preferences differ from the subject’s own preferences. In our task, this signal can be 
measured by  
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difference = bid-for-other – bid-for-self (2). 
 
This signal is computationally useful because it would allow subjects to compute their 
estimate of the value that the other places on the DVDs by computing their own value for 
it, and then carrying out the additive (and signed) adjustment given by the difference signal. 
 
To test this hypothesis we estimated a new GLM 4 in which activity during empathic 
choices is modulated by bid-for-self and the difference signal. Consistent with our post-hoc 
hypothesis, activity in inferior parietal lobule and middle frontal gyrus was significantly 
correlated with the difference regressor (Table 5). Interestingly, the area of IPL identified in 
this model overlaps with those exhibiting increased functional connectivity with the 
vmPFC valuation areas during empathic choices (Fig. 3C). 
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Table 5.  Areas exhibiting a positive correlation with the difference signal  
during empathic choice (GLM 4) 
    
     Region Side k T MNI coordinates 
        x     y     z 
 
  
   Inferior parietal lobe/precuneus L 242 5.22 -39  -54  42 
Middle frontal gyrus L 121 4.47 -39  45   -6 
          
Height threshold: T = 2.74, p < 0.05, whole brain cluster corrected. 
Extent threshold: k = 112 voxels, p < 0.005. 
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DISCUSSION  
 
The results presented here provide the following insights about the computational and 
neurobiological basis of empathic choice. First, empathic choices engage the vmPFC 
valuation system used in self-oriented decisions, and these value signals seem to be 
modulated by activity in regions of IPL known to play a critical role in social processes 
such as empathy. Second, the stimulus values used to make empathic choices are 
computed using a mixture of self-simulation and other-simulation. Third, during 
empathic choices, activity in the IPL encodes a variable measuring the distance between 
the other’s and own preferences. This variable could be used to compute the value of 
DVDs for other starting from the one’s own value, which provides a hint for how the 
mixture of self- and other-simulation are implemented. 
 
The results have implications for various areas of the neural and social sciences. The results 
extend our growing knowledge of how the brain makes decisions to the case of empathic 
choice, which had not been studied before. The results show that empathic decisions 
involve the combination of two types of processes: the basic valuation circuitry involved in 
self-oriented decisions and social processes such as empathy. In particular, in contrast to 
the case of self-oriented choice, in empathic choice, stimulus values in vmPFC seem to be 
modulated by a signal from IPL that reflects the difference in preferences between self and 
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other. This result parallels a recent finding in an fMRI study of charitable donations 
(Hare, Camerer et al. 2010), which found that the value signals in vmPFC were modulated 
by an area of posterior superior temporal cortex commonly associated with mentalizing. 
 
The results also extend our understanding of social cognition in several ways. First, they 
show that the same set of areas that have been shown to play a role in ‘passive’ empathy 
tasks are also at work during empathic choices. Second, they advance our understanding of 
the precise computations carried out by IPL (i.e., a measure of the difference between the 
other’s and the self’s preferences) as well as how they affect decision-making (i.e., by 
modulating activity in the vmPFC valuation circuitry). Third, they advance our 
understanding of the role of mPFC in social cognition, which has been previously 
implicated in person-related and not object-related knowledge (Mitchell, Heatherton et al. 
2002; Mitchell, Macrae et al. 2006; Mitchell 2009). Our results show that, during empathic 
choice, mPFC is involved in the computation of stimulus values. Importantly, the area of 
mPFC characterized here is significantly more ventral than those identified in previous 
studies, none of which involved actual empathic choices. Fourth, the statistical influence of 
own-bids on bids-for-others replicates the “false consensus effect” from social psychology 
(Ross, 77, Marks and Miller 87). The evidence that IPL activity correlates with the 
difference in the two bids suggests a candidate region for explaining differences in the 
strength of false consensus across people or context.   
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The results also have potential practical applications in psychology and economics. They 
suggest that the ability to make sound empathic decisions might depend on the ability to 
compute value signals in vmPFC that give sufficient weight to the differences between 
others and ourselves. It follows that deficits in empathy and general social cognition might 
impair the ability to make sound empathic decisions, which could interfere with everyday 
social interaction. Additional evidence for the role of vmPFC in these types of processes 
comes from lesion studies (Krajbich, Adolphs et al. 2009). 
 
We were surprised to find no other-learning process at work during empathic choice. It is 
possible that this is due to specific features of the current task that might not generalize to 
other settings. In particular, the DVD stimuli used here are highly multi-dimensional and 
complex, which makes it hard to generalize across very different types of films. Thus, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that other-learning processes might be at work in settings 
with a simpler stimulus set. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
CONTROL BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 
  
Twenty subjects (mean age: 21.85, SE: 0.76), with the same demographic characteristics 
required for the main fMRI experiment, participated in a control behavioral study. None of 
the subjects had previously participated in the fMRI experiment. The experiment was 
almost identical to the fMRI task, except for the following differences. First, half of the 
subjects completed the empathic choice task first and the self-oriented choice task second; 
the other half of the subjects completed the tasks in the opposite order. Second, the inter-
trial interval was reduced to 1s, as was the interval between bids and feedback in empathic 
choice trials. Third, subjects completed both tasks on the same day. 
For each individual we carried out a linear regression of bid-for-other on bid-for-self and 
other-bid, separately for self-oriented and empathic choice trials. This regression measures 
the extent to which the bids-for-other were driven by their own preferences or by the actual 
preferences of the other subject. As shown in Fig. S1, we found no significant differences 
across the two order conditions (min p=0.29, t-test). 
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Fig. S1.  Results of the companion behavioral experiment 
 
 
TIME COURSE ANALYSIS FOR vmPFC 
 
We carried out a post-hoc ROI analysis to estimate time courses of BOLD activity in the 
vmPFC valuation areas. This was done as follows. First, we extracted a time course of 
average BOLD activity at each TR within the region of vmPFC that was found to correlate 
with stimulus values in both self-oriented and empathic choice trials (Fig. 1C depicts the 
ROI). Second, we removed from this time course the variance associated with the six 
motion regressors estimated during the pre-processing process. Third, we resampled the 
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time series into ten time bins per TR, and smoothed it using cubic spline interpolation. 
Fourth, we then estimated a finite impulse response model that included separate regressors 
for the following conditions: 1) empathic choice trials for which the bid-for-other was 
above average for those trials, 2) empathic choice trials for which the bid-for-other was 
below average, 3) self-oriented choice trials for which the bid-for-self was above average, 
4) self-oriented choice trials for which the bid-for-self was below average. The model was 
estimated at each time bin within a 20 second window starting at the onset of the DVD cue. 
Finally, the parameter estimates for each condition were averaged across participants at 
each time point. Fig. S2 depicts the results of the analysis. 
 
Fig. S2 . Time course of BOLD responses in the vmPFC valuation area. 
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Fig. S3. Additional regions exhibiting a positive correlation with stimulus values in both 
empathic and self-oriented choice trials (GLM 1). 
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Fig. S4. A) Areas exhibiting higher average (unmodulated) activity during empathic 
choices. B) Areas exhibiting higher average activity during self-oriented choices (GLM 1). 
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR SELF-ORIENTED CHOICE 
TASK 
 
In this experiment you will be bidding on a number of DVDs. To enable this, please note 
that $10 has been placed on the table in front of you. This money is yours to use for this 
experiment. Whatever money you do not use will be yours to keep at the conclusion of the 
experiment. 
 
In each round of the experiment, you will see the cover of a DVD displayed on the screen. 
Please look carefully at the DVD and decide how much you would be willing to pay for the 
DVD on a scale from $0 to $10, in increments of $2. So the possible bids are $0, $2, $4, 
$6, $8, and $10.  If you already own the DVD, bid as if you do not own it. When you are 
ready, enter your bid for that item using the relevant key on the keypad.  If you take longer 
than 6 seconds to enter a bid, one will randomly be selected for you. You should bid in 
the following way: press “z” for $0, “2” for $2, “4” for $4, “6” for $6, “8” 
for $8, and “0” for $10. 
 
After you enter your bid, you will see a blank screen for several seconds, after which the 
next DVD will appear. You will bid in this way for 100 DVDs. After you have completed 
all rounds of the experiment, ONE of the rounds will be selected at random. The computer 
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will generate a random number from 0 to 10. If this number is larger than or equal to 
your bid for the DVD in the selected round, you do not purchase the DVD and keep the 
entire $10. If the number is less than your bid, you pay the amount of the random number 
for the DVD, obtain the DVD, and keep the rest of the $10. Note that if a DVD you already 
own is selected, you will simply keep the $10 and will not have to buy the DVD. 
 
For example, let’s say trial number 22 was selected, and that in this trial you were shown a 
picture of the DVD “The Godfather” and entered a bid of $6. Let’s say the random number 
drawn was 8. In this case, you would not be able to buy the DVD and would keep the entire 
$10. However, if the number drawn were 4, you would purchase the DVD for $4 and keep 
the remaining $6.  
 
Note that only ONE of the rounds will be executed in this way. Note also that you have 
every incentive to be truthful in your bid for each DVD, since any single one of the bidding 
rounds can be implemented at the conclusion of the experiment. You must therefore treat 
every bid as if it will be implemented, though in the end only one of the bids will count. 
You should also note, then, that you do not have to divide your budget of $10 over all the 
rounds – only one of the rounds will actually be implemented, and hence you can treat each 
round as if you have all $10 available for that item. Thus bidding truthfully is the best 
strategy you can use in this experiment. 
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You will now go through five practice rounds to ensure you have understood the 
instructions. These practice rounds will not have any consequences for the actual 
experiment and they will not be used in selecting a random round at the end. Please 
observe the DVD carefully and enter a bid when you are ready, but within 6 
seconds of the DVD appearing. 
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EMPATHIC CHOICE TASK 
 
In this experiment you will be asked to think about the preferences of another person 
(whom you will learn about shortly) and how much that person would be willing to pay for 
a number of DVD titles that will be shown to you. 
 
On the next page, you will learn about the person whose preferences and choices you will 
be trying to guess. This person is a former Caltech student. Please read this carefully, as it 
will contain information that may be valuable to you during the experiment.  
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Meet Todd. He’s from Omaha, NE and studied neuroeconomics at Caltech. He enjoys rock 
climbing, hiking, and yoga. He also enjoys watching movies, and his favorite film is 
Braveheart. He likes sports, pizza, and has a fondness for whisky, but dislikes traffic and 
having to wait for anything. 
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Todd came to our lab last year and went through 100 rounds of the following 
experiment. In each round, he was shown a DVD cover and was asked how much he would 
be willing to pay for that DVD from $0 to $10 in increments of $2 (e.g., either $0, $2, $4, 
$6, $8, or $10). We used a type of auction that ensured that Todd was telling the truth.  
 
This experiment will also consist of 100 rounds. In each round of the experiment, you will 
see the cover of a DVD displayed on the screen for 6 seconds. This DVD cover is 
EXACTLY the same one seen by Todd. So for each DVD that you will see, we know how 
much Todd was willing to pay for it. 
 
Your task in this experiment will be to try to guess the amount that Todd was willing to pay 
for each DVD shown. 
 
In each round of this experiment, you are to look carefully at the DVD cover shown, and 
decide how much you think Todd was willing to pay for the DVD. This value should be 
between $0 and $10 and in increments of $2. Once you have decided on a value, you will 
indicate your bid of $0, $2, and so on by entering the number corresponding to your bid on 
the keypad. You have a maximum of 6 seconds to enter a value, after which a value will be 
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entered for you randomly. You should bid in the following way: press “z” for 
$0, “2” for $2, “4” for $4, “6” for $6, “8” for $8, and “0” for $10. 
 
After you have entered your choice, you will see a fixation screen with a “+” sign for 1 
second. After this fixation screen, in order to help you to get to know Todd better, you will 
be told how far off your guess was from Todd’s actual bid. For example, if your guess was 
$6 while Todd’s guess was $4, you will be told that the error in your guess was 2. If your 
guess was $6 while Todd’s guess was $10, you will be told that the error in your guess was 
-4. Your goal is to minimize the absolute value of the error – you want to obtain errors as 
close to 0 as possible for your guesses. 
 
Following the feedback, after several seconds you will be shown another DVD cover, and 
you will complete the same task again for each round of the experiment.  
 
Remember, this experiment is not about your own preferences, but what you think Todd's 
preferences are based on what you know about him. To ensure you are trying your best to 
guess his preferences, $10 has been placed next to you. This $10 is Todd's money, and you 
will use it to bid on each DVD.  
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After you have completed all rounds of the experiment, ONE of the rounds will be 
selected at random. The computer will generate a random number from 0 to 10. If this 
number is larger than your bid for the DVD in the selected round, you do not purchase the 
DVD with Todd's money, and we give the entire $10 to Todd. If the number is less than or 
equal to your bid, you pay out from Todd's money the amount of the random number for 
the DVD, and Todd obtains the DVD and keeps the rest of the $10. 
 
For example, let's say trial number 22 was selected, and that in this trial you were shown a 
picture of the DVD "The Godfather" and thought that Todd would be willing to pay $6 for 
the DVD. Let's say the random number drawn was 8. In this case, Todd would not be able 
to buy the DVD and would keep the entire $10. However, if the number drawn were 4, 
Todd would have to purchase the DVD for $4 and keep the remaining $6.  
 
Note that only ONE of the rounds will be executed in this way. So you do not have to 
divide Todd's budget of $10 over all the rounds - only one of the rounds will actually be 
implemented, and hence you can treat each round as if Todd has all $10 available for that 
DVD. So you want to bid what you really think Todd would be willing to pay for the DVD 
shown in each round. 
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You will now do five practice rounds to ensure you have understood the instructions. 
These rounds are not based on real data from Todd's decisions; the 'feedback' at the end of 
each round is randomly generated for the practice rounds. These rounds will not have any 
consequences for the experiment; they are simply for you to become familiar with the task 
and to give you an opportunity to ask any questions you may have. Remember to first 
observe the DVD and then enter your decision of what you think Todd was willing to pay 
by entering the corresponding number on the keypad. Remember: press “z” for $0, 
“2” for $2, “4” for $4, “6” for $6, “8” for $8, and “0” for $10.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Variation in Loss Aversion is Associated with Differential Attention to 
Losses 
 
Abstract. Risk aversion is widespread in our daily decisions. A popular explanation is 
loss aversion, or the tendency to prefer avoiding a loss over obtaining a gain by 
overweighting losses relative to gains. A large body of behavioral evidence has shown that 
individuals exhibit loss aversion in many domains; however, the mechanisms behind loss 
aversion remain unknown. Based on recent research that has shown that value-independent 
differences in attention affect the computation and comparison of values during simple 
choice, we hypothesized that differences in loss aversion could be modulated by 
differential attention to losses. In particular, we hypothesized that paying greater attention 
to losses would result in greater loss aversion both across and within subjects. We tested 
this hypothesis using a simple eye-tracking choice task in which subjects made binary 
choices between a mixed-valence lottery and a constant sure outcome. We found that more 
loss averse subjects paid more relative attention to losses: value-independent differences in 
attention account for 72.5% of differences in loss aversion across individuals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many of our daily decisions involve risk, from financial investments to social interactions. 
Human behavior in such scenarios is generally risk averse: people require a much larger 
potential upside to compensate for any potential downside. For example, most people 
would reject a gamble offering them a 50-50 chance of winning or losing $50. They would 
require nearly twice as much in gains, or $100, to compensate for the potential loss of $50. 
This firmly established feature of risk preferences is called loss aversion: losses are 
weighed more heavily, and thus have more impact on choice, than gains of equivalent 
magnitude and likelihood (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Preferences incorporating loss 
aversion can reconcile modest-scale risk aversion where other theories, such as expected 
utility theory, fail (Rabin, 2000). Loss aversion has been conceptualized as a multiplicative 
overweighting of losses relative to gains and has been well established both in the 
laboratory and in real world data. Loss aversion has been found to be responsible for a wide 
range of phenomena, including the endowment effect (Knetsch, Tang, & Thaler, 2001), 
labor market decisions (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, & Thaler, 1997), the pricing and 
purchasing of consumer goods (Hardie, Johnson, & Fader, 1993; Putler, 1992) and 
behavior in financial markets (Barberis & Huang, 2001; Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Odean, 
1998). Studies with primates have shown that they also exhibit loss aversion (Chen, 
Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006). These studies suggest that loss aversion may be a 
fundamental feature of how we assess potential outcomes in risky choice. 
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Little, however, is known about the mechanisms responsible for individual variations in 
loss aversion. A number of studies have shown that loss aversion can be affected by 
framing (Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997). Some 
studies have proposed that loss aversion may be due to some basic hedonic property of our 
reaction to losses, or to an error in judgment caused by an exaggeration of losses’ actual 
proportion (Camerer, 2005; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; Novemsky & 
Kahneman, 2005). It is difficult to distinguish the drivers of loss aversion from purely 
behavioral data alone because different cognitive processes might result in the same 
outward behavior. For example, it may be that some people are more loss averse than 
others because they spend more time evaluating the potential downside of their decisions 
(say, a day of their company’s revenue) compared to the upside (a boost to the company’s 
brand), or because they may be more fearful to face a loss in one domain (a new mate) than 
in another (a new job). Behavioral data can be integrated with psychophysiological 
methods to shed light on the mechanisms behind differences in loss aversion across 
individuals, as well as variation within individuals. 
 
A more recent approach thus uses process tracking to understand choice. A number of 
studies have examined visual fixation patterns during simple choice to show that attention 
affects the computation and comparison of values. Johnson et al. (2007) develop a 
theoretical model that includes attention, in the form of visual fixation, as a decision weight 
over possible outcomes. Willemsen et al. (2011) use computer mouse tracking data to study 
a simple choice task using the Asian disease question (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and an 
  
70 
employment choice paradigm (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) and suggest that framing 
may lead to directional comparisons that distort attribute valuations and thus choice. 
Krajbich et al. (2010) found that visual fixations drive value computation and integration in 
a simple binary choice task: the amount of time subjects spent looking at their options had a 
critical effect on choice. Armel and Rangel (2008) found that willingness to pay for 
appetitive items increases significantly with computation time, while the opposite is true 
for aversive items. Similarly, changing the relative amount of time that subjects fixate on 
an item while making a choice can change the probability the item is chosen (Armel, 
Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008). Busemeyer et al. (1993) develop a cognitive, dynamic model of 
decision making called decision field theory (DFT), which describes how preferences 
might evolve over time before a choice is made. The approach encompasses a range of 
information accumulation models and has been shown to account for a wide range of 
phenomena, including the relation between choice and decision time as well as preference 
reversals (Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002). Glöckner et al. (2011) use an eye-tracking task 
in which participants select between two non-negative outcome gambles to test several 
models of information search. They find that choice proportions are in line with the 
predictions of cumulative prospect theory, and their process data indicate support for 
decision field theory models.  
 
In this paper, we propose to better understand the underlying choice process to uncover 
what drives loss aversion. We investigate attentional processes in the context of financial 
decision making under risk. Specifically, we examine visual fixation patterns to see how 
  
71 
values for losses compared to gains might be constructed and integrated differently both 
across and within individuals. Given the effects of attention on the computation and 
comparison of values during simple choices in these and other studies, we hypothesized 
that differences in loss aversion across and within individuals might be driven by 
differential attention to losses compared to gains. We tested this hypothesis by using an 
eye-tracking decision making experiment in which subjects made binary choices between 
risky options and a constant sure outcome.  
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects. Twenty-two California Institute of Technology students participated in the 
experiment (age: mean = 24.3, SD = 4.7; 9 female). Two subjects were excluded because 
the eye-tracker had difficulty in capturing their gaze. All subjects had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. All subjects were informed about the experiment and gave written 
consent before participating.  
 
Task. Subjects received written instructions for the task and underwent five practice rounds 
to ensure their understanding of the task. They were informed that these trials would have 
no effect on their earnings in the actual experiment. In each trial, subjects first viewed a 
fixation cross in the center of the screen and were asked to fixate on it for 500ms. The trial 
would not commence until they had done so. Subjects then viewed the choice screen. Each 
lottery was comprised of a gain and loss component, as well as percentages indicating the 
likelihood of receiving each, all of which varied across trials (Fig. 1A). Gain and loss 
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values always appeared on top, while the percentages appeared on bottom, though the 
locations of gain and loss were randomized. In each trial, subjects made a choice to accept 
or reject the gamble in favor of a constant sure outcome of $0. Subjects were instructed to 
press “1” if they strongly accepted the gamble, “2” if they weakly accepted the gamble, “3” 
if they weakly rejected the gamble and “4” if they strongly rejected the gamble. Subjects 
completed 384 trials of the task, with a break every 100 trials. The gain outcomes for the 
lotteries were drawn from the set {$2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12} and corresponding losses were 
obtained by multiplying the gain outcomes by a factor ranging from [-¼,-2] in increments 
of ¼ in a factorial design pairing each gain with each multiplier, yielding a total of 48 gain-
loss combinations. These parameters were chosen based on a parameter recovery exercise 
to find lottery values that were efficient for measuring changes in loss aversion (see Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2009). Eight percentage pairings (in which the combined percentages were 
less than 100%, to increase task difficulty) for each of these combinations resulted in a total 
of 48*8 = 384 trials. Subjects were paid a show-up fee and experiment completion fee. In 
addition, five randomly selected trials were implemented for real money at the conclusion 
of the experiment. 
 
Eye Tracking. Eye movements were recorded at 50 Hz using a Tobii desktop-mounted eye 
tracker. Before each trial, subjects were required to maintain fixation at a cross at the center 
of the screen for 500ms before the gamble would appear, ensuring that subjects began each 
trial fixating on the same location.  
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Fig. 1.  (a) The time course of a sample trial. Subjects are forced to fixate at the center of the 
screen for 500ms. They are then presented with the lottery, divided into its gain and loss 
components and the relative probability of obtaining each underneath, and are given as much time 
as they want to make their choice. After selection, subjects see a blank screen for 1s before the next 
trial begins.  
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Data Analysis. We defined four regions of interest (ROIs), or square boxes surrounding 
each of the four numbers appearing on the screen during each trial. The ROIs were located 
in the upper left, lower left, upper right and lower right quadrants of the screen. The eye 
tracker recorded whether the subjects’ fixations fell into one of the ROIs or was not 
recorded (a missing fixation). On average, the latency period (time elapsed between 
stimulus appearance and first recorded fixation) was 247.50 ms (SD = 45.74 ms). The 
latency period was assumed to be due to peripheral attentional processes involved in first 
fixation selection and not part of the decision time. Subjects spent 11.94% (SD = 5.12%) of 
each trial looking at a point other than one of the four ROIs. Missing fixations during the 
trial were treated as follows:  
 
1) If the missing fixations were recorded between fixations to the same item, then 
those missing fixations were changed to that item and assumed to be response 
time. For example, a fixation pattern of “upper left, missing, upper left” would 
become “upper left, upper left, upper left.”  
2) If the missing fixations were recorded between fixations to different items, then 
those missing fixations were discarded and not counted in response time. 
 
These missing fixations were likely due to momentary transitions between items or 
momentary loss of fixation from the eye tracker. The mean number of trials dropped per 
subject was 0.70 (SD = 1.42). The mean response time was 3952 ms (SD = 1231 ms).  
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Prospect Theory Model. We estimated the parameters of a prospect theory model for 
each subject (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The subjective utility of a lottery L is defined 
by four parameters: the gain or loss amount x, the percentage chance of receiving that 
amount p(x); the loss aversion coefficient 𝜆, and the curvature of the utility function 𝛼 
(representing risk aversion due to the presence of diminishing sensitivity to changes in 
value as the absolute value increases). The subjective utility of each lottery was estimated 
with Equation (1), while Equation (2) translates the difference between the subjective value 
of the lottery and the subjective value of the certain amount (0) into a probability of gamble 
acceptance using the logit sensitivity 𝜇:  
 
𝑢 (𝐿) = 𝑝 𝑥 ∙ 𝑥! ,          𝑥 ≥ 0 −𝜆 ∙  𝑝 𝑥   ∙ 𝑥 ! ,          𝑥 < 0            (1) 
𝑝 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = !!!!!! ! !"#$%& !! !"#$%&'             (2) 
 
The lottery values themselves were originally chosen based on a parameter recovery 
exercise to find lottery values that were efficient for measuring changes in loss aversion, 
similar to that employed by Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009). In essence, a hypothetical 
participant was created by selecting a range of psychologically plausible values for the 
three model parameters based on results from earlier studies. Stochastic choices were 
simulated, using those parameter values and Eq. 2, over the initial monetary amounts. 
Given these simulated choices, we then used the maximum-likelihood procedure to 
estimate parameters by maximizing the following likelihood function: 
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 𝑙 𝛼, 𝜆, 𝜇 𝑦 = 𝑦! log 𝑝(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡) + (1−!"#!!! 𝑦!) log 1− 𝑝 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡           (3) 
 
where 𝛼, 𝜆 and 𝜇 are the parameters to be estimated, y is the subject response, i is the trial 
number, and p(accept) is as defined in Eq. 2. The Nelder-Mead Simplex Method as 
implemented in Matlab 2007a was used to obtain estimates for each parameter. If the 
estimated parameters were close to the actual ones used to create the simulated data, then 
we could say that the modeling procedure could ‘‘recover’’ parameter values accurately. 
We used this method of creating our stimuli to improve our ability to accurately recover a 
range of parameter values from actual participants given the choices made and therefore 
increase the power of statistical tests to detect differences across and within subjects. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Basic psychometrics. The mean parameter values estimated across all subjects were as 
follows: 𝜇 = 6.98 (SE = 1.70), 𝛼 = 0.79 (SE = 0.07), 𝜆 = 1.53 (SE = 0.12) (See Table S1 for 
details). Note that there were five subjects with unusually low values of 𝛼, 𝛼 < 0.50. To 
ensure the robustness of our main results, we repeated several keys analyses with these five 
subjects removed (see Appendix, Fig. S1). The results did not differ from our main 
findings. 
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The model fit the choice curve well. The choice data indicate that choices were a logistic 
function of the subjective lottery value lottery value (pseudo-R2=0.55; Fig. 1B). Reaction 
times and number of fixations both correlated with difficulty (mixed effects regression 
estimates: -16.23, p=0.05, and -0.09, p=0.0000, respectively; Fig. 1C-D). 
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Fig. 1.  (b) Psychometric choice curve.  
 
 
Fig. 1.  (c)  Reaction time as a function of difficulty (the absolute value of the subjective value of 
the lottery).  
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Fig. 1.  (d)  Number of fixations as a function of difficulty (the absolute value of the subjective 
value of the lottery). 
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Attentional biases across subjects. Consistent with the first hypothesis, we found that 
more loss averse subjects paid more relative attention to losses. The loss aversion 
coefficient 𝜆 is positively correlated with the relative time spent looking at losses compared 
to gains (mixed effects regression estimate: 0.08, p=0.02; Fig. 2A).  
 
To calculate the magnitude of this effect across subjects, we performed the following 
analysis. We took the 5% and 95% individual loss aversion coefficients across subjects, 𝜆!% and 𝜆!"%, respectively, according to the distribution of the relative time spent looking 
at losses compared to gains. We divided the difference 𝜆!% − 𝜆!"% by the difference 
between the maximum and minimum loss aversion coefficients, 𝜆!"# − 𝜆!"#, to obtain a 
statistic indicating the percentage of the differences in loss aversion across individuals that 
is accounted for by value-independent differences in attention: 72.5%. 
 
Across subjects, the correlation between 𝜆 and the total time spent looking at the loss 
amount was 0.49 (p=0.03), while the correlation between 𝜆 and the total time spent looking 
at the gain amount was 0.17 (p=0.49). The correlation between 𝜆 and the difference in the 
percent of time spent looking at the loss amount vs. the gain amount was 0.51 (p=0.02).  
 
Attentional biases within subjects. We also conducted another analysis in which we 
examined whether the magnitude of differences in loss aversion are correlated with the 
magnitude of attentional fluctuations within subjects. For each subject, we divided the trials 
into two halves based on whether excess total fixation to gains over losses is above or 
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below the median. We then estimated the model parameters for each subject in each of 
the samples independently. We found that the mean difference in 𝜆 between the below and 
above median samples is 0.12 (SD = 0.026, p=0.02). Fig. 2B shows a scatter plot of the 
difference in lambda vs. the difference in percent time looking at losses in the two samples 
(mixed effects regression estimate: 0.06, p=0.05). 
 
To calculate the magnitude of this effect within subjects, for each subject, we looked at the 
5% and 95% probability of accepting the lottery, 𝑝!% and 𝑝!"%, as a function of the 
difference in time spent looking at gains compared to losses. The percent of the variation in 𝜆 that is explained by their fixation is then given by dividing the difference 𝑝!% – 𝑝!"% by 
the difference in the time spent looking at gains compared to losses for each individual. On 
average, we found that the percentage of variation in the probability of accepting the lottery 
explained by the amount of time spent looking at the loss amount vs. the gain amount is 
6.25% (SE = 2.09%). Fig. 2C shows a histogram of the individual percentage variations. 
 
In addition, we found a strong relationship between the last fixation and choice. 
Specifically, for the last fixation only, subjects spent more time looking at gains compared 
to losses as expected value increased (mixed effects regression estimate: 28.64, p=0.0001; 
Fig. 3A). There is thus a bias toward the chosen item.  
 
Properties of the general search process. However, this choice bias does not extend to the 
general nature of the fixation process, which is independent of underlying value. To rule 
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out that our main effect is simply due to subjects paying more attention to large gains or 
losses compared to smaller ones, we examine whether the time spent looking at gains 
compared to losses is a function of the expected value of the lottery. If subjects were 
paying more attention to more attractive options (e.g., large gains), we would expect this 
relationship to be positive, resulting in an upward sloping curve. However, we find that 
there is a nearly flat relationship between expected value and time spent looking at gains 
compared to losses (mixed effects regression estimate: 2.42, p=0.05; Fig. 3B). While the 
relationship is significant, it is extremely small and cannot account for the effect. Note that 
as the last fixation displays a choice bias, the last fixation has been discarded here. 
 
We also examine several additional fixation properties. First, the probability that the first 
fixation was to the upper left was much higher than for any of the other areas (Fig. S2A). 
This is likely a cultural artefact from reading left to right and top to bottom. As a result, the 
first fixation was more likely to be to either the gain or loss amount, while later fixations 
were more likely to be to the probabilities (Fig. S2B). The last five fixations did not show 
any bias towards area (Fig. S2C) or type (Fig. S2D). Fixation duration was relatively 
constant regardless of the item location (Fig. S3A) or type (Fig. S3B).  
 
An analysis of subjects’ transitions among the gain and loss amounts and probabilities 
indicated a common pattern (Fig. S4).  Subjects were much more likely to exhibit 
horizontal and vertical rather than diagonal fixations.  
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Fig. 2.  (a)  Lambda coefficients estimated for each subject as a function of the percent of time 
spent looking at the dollar value of the loss – the dollar value of the gain.  
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Fig. 2.  (b)  Scatter plot of the difference in lambda vs. the difference in percent time looking at 
losses after dividing individual trials into two halves based on whether excess total fixation to gains 
over losses is above or below the median.  
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Fig. 2.  (c) Histogram of individual percentage variations in the probability of accepting the 
lottery explained by the amount of time spent looking at the loss amount vs. the gain amount. 
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Fig. 3. (a)  For the last fixation only, time looking at the dollar value of the gain minus time 
looking at the dollar value of the loss as a function of the expected value of the lottery. (b)  Across 
all but the last fixation, time looking at the dollar value of the gain minus time looking at the dollar 
value of the loss as a function of the expected value of the lottery.  
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DISCUSSION  
 
Our study provides insight into how we process risk. The results describe the nature of the 
attentional processes that guide choice in a simple lottery task. Specifically, we show that 
attention plays a key role in differences in loss aversion both across and within subjects. 
Our results suggest a model in which attention must be included to make any inferences on 
choice. In addition, our data also demonstrate that prospect theory can account for a 
number of correlations between choice and fixation patterns.  
 
Our results contribute to the literature on the cognitive processes behind information search 
and integration. While subjects in our study were not under any time constraints, we find 
evidence to support some of the key predictions of DFT, including preference variability 
and a strong relationship between preference and reaction time. Similarly to Krajbich et 
al.’s (2010) attentional drift diffusion model (DDM), we found that the first and middle 
fixations were independent of the value of the fixated item. Our data also display a last-
fixation bias, which in the DDM framework, is a direct implication of the fact that the value 
of the non-fixated item is discounted. In our experiment, subjects discount the lottery when 
they spend more time looking at losses during the last fixation. Other results, however, 
were inconsistent with the predictions of the DDM. This is likely due to the fact that 
lotteries are much more complex stimuli than snack foods, and attentional processes are 
deployed differently. 
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An important question raised by our results is the directionality of the relationship 
between attention and loss aversion. Is it that more loss averse individuals pay more 
attention to losses, or that paying more attention to losses causes one to become more loss 
averse? Several related studies have shown that it is possible to bias choices by 
exogenously manipulating relative fixation durations and that the fixation process may 
have a causal effect on the value comparison process (Armel et al., 2008; Shimojo, Simion, 
Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). Willemsen et al. (2011) use a path model relating gain vs. loss 
frames and reference options to information acquisition and choice. They find that the 
framing of gains vs. losses as well as reference points affect attentional differences, and 
these changes significantly affect both search and choice. However, the evidence in this 
study is not sufficient to establish a causal relationship between attention and loss aversion. 
An experiment manipulating subjects’ fixations to establish causality is thus a promising 
idea for future research. Another topic for future study is how changes in emotional states, 
such as stress, may change loss aversion and thus risk aversion. Understanding how loss 
aversion changes within individuals in different contexts can further uncover the 
mechanisms driving loss aversion. 
 
In addition, our results do not rule out the possibility that subjects’ values may have an 
effect on fixation patterns. While expected value did not have an effect on fixation patterns, 
reaction time did increase with choice difficulty. Thus random variation in fixation duration 
might affect the search process and thus choice. An open question is therefore to test 
whether the relationship between values and fixations is actually exogenous and how the 
fixation process takes value into account. 
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An additional question that was not tackled in this paper is how such choices might be 
implemented in the brain. One brain region that is likely to be involved is the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), which has been found to encode value at the time of choice in 
a number of different studies and contexts. Tom et al. (2007) found that activity in mOFC 
during a monetary risky choice task correlated with stimulus values consistent with the 
predictions of prospect theory. Furthermore, the authors found that the same area of mOFC 
correlates with both positive and negative potential outcomes. Similarly, Plassmann et al. 
(2010) found that mOFC activity correlates with the appetitiveness and aversiveness of 
foods. Levy et al. (2010) further showed that the mOFC encodes subjective values in 
choice under risk as well as ambiguity. Basten et al. (2010) found evidence that the brain 
weighs costs against benefits by combining neural benefit and cost signals into a single 
representation of value that is accumulated over time, in accordance with perceptual 
diffusion models. Most recently, Lim et al. (2011) showed that value computations in the 
mOFC and the ventral striatum are fixation-dependent: activity in the these areas correlates 
with the difference in value between attended and unattended items. The question of how 
attention influences these computations and whether these signals are driven by attentional 
processes elsewhere in the brain remains an open question. 
 
Our results have important implications for decision making and the role of attentional 
processes in choice. Our data show that systematic biases in fixations could lead to 
different choices. Moreover, as biases such as loss aversion can lead to deficits in decision-
making, our findings raise the interesting possibility that we may be able to modulate our 
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attention to make better choices. Further uncovering the relationship between attention 
and loss aversion is of direct interest to a number of fields, including psychology, 
economics and neuroscience. 
 
  
  
91 
REFERENCES 
 
Armel, K. C., Beaumel, A. and Rangel, A. (2008). Biasing simple choices by manipulating 
relative visual attention. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(5), 396-403.  
Armel, K. C. and Rangel, A. (2008). The impact of computation time and experience on 
decision values. American Economic Review, 98(2), 163-168. doi: Doi 
10.1257/Aer.98.2.163 
Barberis, N. and Huang, M. (2001). Mental accounting, loss aversion, and individual stock 
returns. The Journal of Finance, 56(4), 1247-1292.  
Basten, U., Biele, G., Heekeren, H. R. and Fiebach, C. J. (2010). How the brain integrates 
costs and benefits during decision making. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 107, 21767-21772.  
Benartzi, S. and Thaler, R. H. (1995). Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 73-92.  
Busemeyer, J. R. and Diederich, A. (2002). Survey of decision field theory. Mathematical 
Social Sciences, 43, 345-370.  
Busemeyer, J. R. and Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision field theory: a dynamic-cognitive 
approach to decision making in an uncertain environment. Psychological Review, 
100(3), 432-459.  
Camerer, C. (2005). Three cheers - psychological, theoretical, empirical - for loss aversion. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 42(2), 129-133.  
  
92 
Camerer, C., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G. and Thaler, R. (1997). Labor supply of New 
York City cabdrivers: One day at a time. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 
407-441.  
Chen, M. K., Lakshminarayanan, V. and Santos, L. R. (2006). How basic are behavioral 
biases? Evidence from capuchin monkey trading behavior. Journal of Political 
Economy, 114(3), 517-537.  
Glockner, A. and Herbold, A. K. (2011). An Eye-tracking Study on Information Processing 
in Risky Decisions: Evidence for Compensatory Strategies Based on Automatic 
Processes. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 24(1), 71-98. doi: Doi 
10.1002/Bdm.684 
Gneezy, U. and Potters, J. (1997). An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 631-645.  
Hardie, B. G. S., Johnson, E. J. and Fader, P. S. (1993). Modeling Loss Aversion and 
Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice. Marketing Science, 12(4), 378-
394.  
Johnson, J. G. and Busemeyer, J. R. (2007). A computational model of the attentional 
processes used to generate decision weights in risky decision making. Under 
revision for Cognition.  
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory - Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.  
Kermer, D. A., Driver-Linn, E., Wilson, T. D. and Gilbert, D. T. (2006). Loss aversion is 
an affective forecasting error. Psychological Science, 17(8), 649-653.  
  
93 
Knetsch, J. L., Tang, F. and Thaler, R. H. (2001). The endowment effect and repeated 
market trials: is the Vickrey auction demand revealing? Experimental Economics, 
4(2), 257-269.  
Krajbich, I., Armel, C. and Rangel, A. (2010). Visual fixations and the computation and 
comparison of value in simple choice. Nature Neuroscience, 13(10), 1292-1298. 
doi: Doi 10.1038/Nn.2635 
Levy, I., Snell, J., Nelson, A. J., Rustichini, A. and Glimcher, P. W. (2010). Neural 
Representation of Subjective Value Under Risk and Ambiguity. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 103(2), 1036-1047. doi: Doi 10.1152/Jn.00853.2009 
Lim, S. L., O'Doherty, J. P. and Rangel, A. (2011). The Decision Value Computations in 
the vmPFC and Striatum Use a Relative Value Code That is Guided by Visual 
Attention. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(37), 13214-13223. doi: Doi 
10.1523/Jneurosci.1246-11.2011 
Novemsky, N. and Kahneman, D. (2005). How do intentions affect loss aversion? Journal 
of Marketing Research, 42(2), 139-140.  
Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? Journal of Finance, 53(5), 
1775-1798.  
Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J. P. and Rangel, A. (2010). Appetitive and Aversive Goal 
Values Are Encoded in the Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex at the Time of Decision 
Making. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(32), 10799-10808. doi: Doi 
10.1523/Jneurosci.0788-10.2010 
Putler, D. S. (1992). Incorporating Reference Price Effects into a Theory of Consumer 
Choice. Marketing Science, 11(3), 287-309.  
  
94 
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. 
Econometrica, 68(5), 1281-1292.  
Shimojo, S., Simion, C., Shimojo, E. and Scheier, C. (2003). Gaze bias both reflects and 
influences preference. Nature Neuroscience, 6(12), 1317-1322. doi: Doi 
10.1038/Nn1150 
Sokol-Hessner, P., Hsu, M., Curley, N. G., Delgado, M. R., Camerer, C. F. and Phelps, E. 
A. (2009). Thinking like a trader selectively reduces individuals' loss aversion. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
106(13), 5035-5040. doi: Doi 10.1073/Pnas.0806761106 
Thaler, R. H., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. and Schwartz, A. (1997). The effect of myopia 
and loss aversion on risk taking: An experimental test. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112(2), 647-661.  
Tom, S. M., Fox, C. R., Trepel, C. and Poldrack, R. A. (2007). The neural basis of loss 
aversion in decision-making under risk. Science, 315(5811), 515-518. doi: Doi 
10.1126/Science.1134239 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice. Science, 211(4481), 453-458.  
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice - a Reference-
Dependent Model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.  
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in Prospect-Theory - Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323.  
  
95 
Willemsen, M. C., Bockenholt, U. and Johnson, E. J. (2011). Choice by Value Encoding 
and Value Construction: Processes of Loss Aversion. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-General, 140(3), 303-324. doi: Doi 10.1037/A0023493 
 
 
  
  
96 
APPENDIX 
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table S1. Parameter estimates for all subjects. BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
 
Subject µ ! "
Log 
likelihood BIC
1 8.73 0.95 1.12 128.47 -239.09
2 10.38 0.43 1.08 236.56 -455.27
3 2.60 0.95 1.40 144.36 -270.87
4 33.66 0.13 1.02 300.2 -582.55
5 13.21 0.49 1.21 177.29 -336.73
6 1.15 0.82 1.77 236.29 -454.73
7 4.30 0.92 1.04 171.16 -324.47
8 17.68 0.22 1.35 243.56 -469.27
9 2.19 0.79 2.44 213.19 -408.53
10 8.41 0.42 1.54 183.21 -348.57
11 5.75 0.74 2.81 232.86 -447.87
12 3.16 1.12 0.88 194.36 -370.87
13 5.52 1.01 1.22 120.22 -222.59
14 2.45 1.17 1.91 138.45 -259.05
15 0.38 1.50 2.48 178.37 -338.89
16 4.21 0.84 1.25 144.65 -271.45
17 5.07 0.91 1.17 137.94 -258.03
18 2.16 0.87 1.87 172.78 -327.71
19 5.11 0.65 1.79 163.94 -310.03
20 3.41 0.97 1.29 132.46 -247.07
Mean 6.98 0.79 1.53 182.52 -347.18
SE 1.70 0.07 0.12 10.73 21.46  
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Fig. S1. Probability of fixation (a)  to a given area and (b)  for a given type for the first 
five fixations, and probability of fixation (c)  to a given area and (d)  for a given type for 
the last five fixations. 
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Fig. S2. Fixation duration as a function of (a)  area and (b)  type. 
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Fig. S3. Probability of transition to an area given current area of fixation. 
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Fig. S4. Key figures with five subjects with 𝛼 < 0.50 excluded. (a) Fig. 1b, (b)  Fig. 
2a, (c)  Fig. 2b. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Display and Search Dynamics in Multi-Attribute Choice 
 
Abstract. Consumer choices are a crucial component of everyday decisions. When 
entering a store to make a purchase, consumers must dynamically search and select among 
a variety of options.  Understanding the details of this decision-making process is therefore 
essential for developing models of choice behavior. This raises two questions that are 
studied in this paper: (1) What attentional processes are involved in the choice between 
multi-attribute consumer goods? (2) Do simple display changes affect these attentional 
processes and thus choice? We hypothesized that (1) value-independent differences in 
attention impact multi-attribute choice, and (2) simple changes to the display impact the 
attentional fixation process and thus choice. We tested these hypotheses using a two-item, 
two-attribute choice task to determine how decision-making processes are modified by the 
introduction of multiple discrete attributes for each item. Subjects were presented with 
pairs of posters, each of a different design and size, and asked to choose the more desirable 
one.  Attributes of each choice were arranged in two visual conditions: designs on top, and 
sizes on top.  MouseLab was used to gather detailed search-process data. We found that 
attentional processes play a key role in integrating across multi-attribute goods in consumer 
choice. Moreover, we found that simple display changes resulted in striking differences in 
visual search patterns, which subsequently impacted choice through differential weighting 
and integration of the attributes. Our results demonstrate the value of understanding 
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computational processes in consumer choice and have important applications in 
economics and marketing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Consider the hundreds, if not thousands, of choices made every day between items that 
differ in many dimensions, such as color, taste, and size. Consumers need to dynamically 
search over an often complex choice set. Understanding the details of this decision-making 
process is essential for developing models of choice behavior. This raises two basic 
questions that we study in this paper: (1) How do attentional fixation processes impact 
choice for multi-attribute consumer goods? (2) Do simple display changes affect these 
attentional processes and thus choice? 
 
This study builds on previous literature from economics and marketing that has used visual 
attention to provide a window into the computational processes involved in consumer 
decisions. Such studies have typically used process data, such as eye-tracking or MouseLab 
(Payne et al., 1993; Camerer et al., 1993), to examine choice among several alternatives 
because they allow experimenters to track where subjects look in a display. Process data 
can provide important insight to help us understand and influence consumer choice, an 
endeavor on which companies spend billions of dollars every year. An understanding of the 
computational processes behind consumers’ decisions can yield a better model of 
consumers’ well-being and help make predictions about how changes in the display of 
multi-attribute consumer goods can affect attention and thus choice. 
 
In economics, a number of studies have examined the computational process used to make 
strategic decisions. For example, Camerer et al. (1993) and Johnson et al. (2002) showed 
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that subjects often did not look ahead or look at their partners’ payoffs in determining 
offer patterns in bargaining settings. Gabaix et al. (2006) used MouseLab to investigate 
information acquisition under both time and financial constraints. They found evidence to 
support a directed cognition model, which assumes that subjects use partially myopic 
option-value calculations to determine how to search among several options. Knoepfle et 
al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2010) used eye-tracking to study information transmission and 
found that visual fixations as well as pupil dilation could be used to predict an otherwise 
unobservable, private information state. Similarly, Caplin et al. (2011) collected interim 
choice data to better understand the dynamic search algorithm used by subjects when faced 
with complex choices. However, none of these studies investigate consumer choice. 
 
Several marketing studies have looked into consumer choice using different types of 
displays. However, most such studies have been limited to hypothetical choice. For 
example, Van der Lans et al. (2008) studied how subjects found brand information within a 
display; however, no choices were made in the experiment. Russo et al. (1975) found a 
critical role for fixation patterns in multi-alternative, multi-attribute choice with car 
descriptions, though only hypothetical choices were made. Chandon et al. (2008) analyzed 
commercial eye-tracking data collected for hypothetical magazine product ads and found 
that packaging played a more dominant role than pricing in attentional fixations, but the 
authors did not control for visual saliency or display location. Lohse (1997) used a business 
phone directory search task and found that display ads were more significantly noticed than 
plain listings, and viewed color ads more quickly and for longer duration than non-color 
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ads. However, such effects might simply be due to the greater saliency and complexity 
of larger and more colorful items. 
 
More recently, Krajbich et al. (2010) used eye-tracking to study simple binary choice 
between snack foods and found strong evidence in favor of a drift-diffusion model (DDM) 
in which integration is driven by visual attention. In particular, while the fixation process is 
random with respect to the value of the items, fixations have a considerable effect on value 
integration in item comparison, through which attentional fixations subsequently bias 
choice. Krajbich et al. (2011) extended the model to the case of multi-alternative choice. 
Reutskaja et al. (2011) used a similar eye-tracking paradigm to examine multi-alternative 
choice under time pressure and found that subjects appear to use a stopping rule to 
terminate the search process, which leads them to choose items they looked at first as well 
as more often. 
 
A related class of models to the DDM is decision field theory (DFT), a cognitive, dynamic 
model of decision making developed by Busemeyer et al. (1993). DFT describes how 
preferences might evolve over time before a choice is made; in such models, fixations 
matter for sequential integration across multidimensional items. In DFT, fixations focus the 
integration of value to a subset of dimensions, unlike in DDMs, in which fixations bias the 
integration of value in favor of one of the items. The approach encompasses a range of 
information accumulation models and has been shown to account for a wide range of 
phenomena, including the relation between choice and decision time as well as preference 
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reversals (Roe et al., 2001; Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002). However, there is little 
direct testing of the impact of fixations on choice in DFT using eye-tracking. 
 
The above studies have yielded a deeper investigation of the underlying computational 
processes, which is central to understanding how preferences are built, and, as a result, how 
choices are made. However, these studies have not addressed how multiple attributes might 
be integrated when making choices between multiple items, and there is no evidence with 
real choice demonstrating the effects of display on choice through the attentional fixation 
process.  
 
In this paper, we disentangle how different attributes of a product, such as visual design or 
size, are evaluated and integrated when choosing between two similar products. We build 
on the attentional DDM model put forth by Krajbich et al. (2010), which makes stark 
predictions about the relationship between attentional fixation patterns and choice. We 
extend their framework on the attentional DDM model to the domain of multi-attribute 
choice by examining the computational processes used to search and identify multiple 
attributes and integrate across these attributes to make a choice. Our experimental design 
also allows us to test if the visual fixation process depends on display effects. Specifically, 
we hypothesize that (1) value-independent differences in attention impact multi-attribute 
choice, and (2) simple changes to the display impact the attentional fixation process and 
thus choice.  
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We tested these hypotheses using a two-item, two-attribute choice task to determine 
how decision-making processes are modified by the introduction of multiple discrete 
attributes for each item. We first elicited subjects’ valuations over poster designs and sizes. 
Subjects were then presented with pairs of posters, each of a different design and size, and 
asked to choose the more desirable one.  Attributes of each choice were arranged in two 
visual conditions: designs on top, and sizes on top.  MouseLab was used to gather detailed 
search-process data. Our experimental design allowed us to test if the choice process is 
influenced by display effects––in other words, whether the location of an item in the 
display affects its probability of selection. First, we found evidence to support the 
hypothesis that value-independent attentional fixation processes play a key role in 
integrating across multi-attribute goods in consumer choice. Second, we found that simple 
display changes resulted in striking differences in visual search patterns, which 
subsequently impacted choice through differential weighting and integration of the 
attributes. 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants. Seventy-four participants completed the experiment (age: mean = 33.03, SD 
= 8.28; 71% female), which was administered over the internet as part of a larger online 
survey. Participants were recruited from an online pool registered with the Center for 
Decision Sciences at Columbia University. Each participant completed the entire survey 
and received compensation for their participation.   
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Stimuli and recording. Participants viewed images of seven artistic posters (sourced 
from zazzle.com) displayed on their computer screens. Stimulus presentation and response 
recording were controlled using the MouseLab Web process tracing tool (Payne et al., 
1993).   
 
Task. Participants received extensive training in the use of MouseLab at the beginning of 
the session. Participants were then instructed at the start of the experiment that they would 
make a series of choices between pairs of artistic posters of different designs and sizes. To 
incentivize participants to take their choices seriously, they were told that they would be 
mailed a poster based upon the choice made during one randomly-selected trial. A copy of 
the instructions is included in the Appendix. 
 
Each participant then performed two rating tasks. In the first task they viewed and rated 
seven poster designs. On each trial one poster design was displayed on-screen, and 
participants rated the design on a scale from 1 (do not like it at all) to 7 (like it very much) 
by clicking an appropriate radio button below the design. Once participants had entered a 
rating and pressed the “continue” button, the trial ended. Participants had unlimited time to 
make each rating. Each of the seven poster designs was presented once, with order of 
presentation randomized across participants.   
 
In the second rating task participants viewed and rated three poster sizes. Before the task 
began participants were shown a relative comparison of the sizes. Three solid gray boxes 
displayed side-by-side (size increasing left-to-right) depicted the relative sizes of the poster 
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types. Above each box a label indicated the actual size of each poster type: “portfolio 
(circa 15’’ x 11’’)”; “small (circa 20’’ x 15’’)”; and “large (circa 30’’ x 23’’).” Participants 
were given unlimited time to examine the screen before beginning the rating task. On each 
trial of the task one of the solid gray boxes from the pre-task screen was displayed along 
with its corresponding size label. Participants rated the size on a scale from 1 (do not like it 
at all) to 7 (like it very much) by clicking an appropriate radio button below the rectangle. 
The trial ended and choices were recorded when the participant pressed the “continue” 
button. Participants had unlimited time to make each rating. Each of the three sizes was 
presented once, with order of presentation randomized across participants. 
 
Participants then performed the main choice task, consisting of 30 trials. On each trial the 
participant chose between a pair of posters. Every poster was composed of two attributes: a 
design and a size. Attributes of one poster were displayed top to bottom on the left size of 
the screen, while attributes of the other were displayed in the same order on the right side. 
Display order was counterbalanced across participants: half viewed designs on top on all 
trials (C1; Figure 1a), while the other half viewed sizes on top (C2; Figure 1b).   
 
Poster pairs were constructed by combining every unordered pair of the participant’s five 
highest-rated designs (ties broken by random selection) with every unordered pair of sizes, 
resulting in 10 * 3 = 30 distinct unordered poster pairs. Order of presentation of the pairs 
was then randomized to construct 30 trials. On each trial the display order (left-to-right) of 
the designs was randomized. The pairing of each design and size was chosen to ensure non-
dominated choices (e.g., so that the higher-rated design was not also paired with the higher-
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rated size)––the higher-rated design was paired with the lower-rated size, and vice 
versa. In cases of equally-rated designs or sizes, the presentation of sizes was determined 
by random selection. 
 
In order to track search processes, each attribute was hidden behind a solid gray box that 
revealed its contents only while the participant held the mouse cursor over the box. Boxes 
were labeled with the attribute revealed by opening them. To prevent selection bias due to 
initial positioning of the mouse cursor, participants began each trial by clicking on a cross 
positioned between the four attribute boxes at the center of the display. Participants had 
unlimited time to complete each trial. The trial ended and the choice was recorded when 
the participant pressed the “choose” button beneath a poster. The locations, timings, and 
durations of each “fixation” (defined by the opening and closing of a box) and the ultimate 
choice were recorded by MouseLab Web.   
 
After the choice task was completed, one trial was randomly selected and the poster 
selected on that trial was mailed to the participant. 
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Fig. 1. (a) Sample choice screen for condition 1 (C1), with poster designs on top. (b) 
Sample choice screen for condition 2 (C2), with poster sizes on top.  
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Data analysis. As the study was administered over the internet, we could not directly 
monitor participants’ activity to ensure compliance with instructions or ensure that 
participants remained attentive during every trial. We used a data-cleaning procedure 
screen for improperly completed trials and inattentive participants. 
 
To screen for accidental fixations caused by moving the mouse briefly across one box to 
reach another, we discarded any fixations with a duration less than 100 ms. We chose a low 
threshold to ensure that such fixations were truly accidental and not part of the participant’s 
search pattern and that the subject gained no information about the stimuli even through the 
short-duration fixation. 
 
To ensure that participants remained attentive throughout each trial, we employed several 
tests to screen for anomalous trials. First, we discarded all trials with reaction times more 
than 4 SD above or below the mean across all participants (mean = 6.53 s, SD = 4.12 s). 
Second, we discarded all trials in which the average fixation duration was more than 4 SD 
above the mean across all participants (mean = 0.735 s, SD = 0.242 s). Third, we discarded 
all trials in which the average transition time between fixations was more than 4 SD above 
the mean of across all participants (mean = 0.105 s, SD = 0.103 s). These tests were 
collectively designed to screen for trials in which participants were not attentive to the task, 
as signaled by an excessively fast choice (suggesting that the choice was not fully 
considered and was made haphazardly) or excessively slow performance during the trial 
(suggesting that the participants became distracted during performance of the trial or 
walked away from the computer). As an additional safeguard, we discarded any subject 
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who successfully completed fewer than 15 trials (half of the total) as determined by the 
data-cleaning procedures.  
 
As a result of the cleaning, we discarded an average of 1.4 trials per participant (M = 1.43, 
SD = 2.39). One participant was eliminated entirely. 
 
Finally, sometimes subjects returned to the same area of fixation immediately following a 
fixation; such fixations were treated as one fixation with a duration equal to the sum of the 
two separate fixations.  
 
Theoretical model. The theoretical model developed here extends the attentional DDM put 
forth by Krajbich et al. (2010) to the domain of multi-attribute choice. Their model takes as 
a framework DDMs of binary response selection (Stone, 1960; Ratcliff, 1978) that have 
proved to be quite accurate in describing a range of perceptual decision making data (Gold 
et al., 2001; Gold et al., 2002; Mazurek et al., 2003). The key idea behind such models as 
applied to binary choice is that the stochastic evidence for one response (the relative 
decision value, or RDV) is accumulated over time until the integrated evidence passes a 
decision threshold, and a choice is made. There is thus a tradeoff between the benefit of 
accumulating more information and the cost of taking more time to make a choice. 
Krajbich et al. (2010) apply this type of model to the domain of binary choice for simple 
snack items and find that it explains many relationships between choice and fixation 
patterns. 
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Following Krajbich et al. (2010), our model assumes that an RDV, which evolves over 
time as a Markov Gaussian process, is computed until a choice is made. In our case, we 
have a choice between two posters with two attributes each, design and size. The RDV 
starts each trial at 0 and continually evolves over time at one of two possible rates, 𝜇! , 𝜇! 
(both in units of ms-1), depending on which attribute is fixated, design or size, respectively. 
A choice is made when a threshold is reached at either +1 or -1. If the RDV reaches the +1 
threshold, the left item is chosen; if the RDV reaches the -1 threshold, the right item is 
chosen. We assume that consumers have independent valuations over designs and sizes 
that can be elicited through prior ratings, just as in the single-attribute case. These 
valuations are termed 𝑟!!, 𝑟!!, 𝑟!!, 𝑟!! , representing the two design ratings and the two size 
ratings for the items on the screen for any trial. Importantly, the slope with which the RDV 
evolves depends on the fixation location at that instant. The slope is proportional to the 
weighted difference between the values of the fixated and non-fixated items and is given by 
the following expression: 
 𝑓 𝑟!!, 𝑟!!, 𝑟!!, 𝑟!!,𝐸! = 𝛼!!!𝑟!! + 𝛼!!!𝑟!! − 𝛼!!!𝑟!! − 𝛼!!!𝑟!!     (1) 
The coefficients of this expression are given by: 
𝛼!"# = 𝜇! ,   𝑓!" = 1         𝜇!𝜃,   𝑓!,!!! = 1                 0,   otherwise             (2) 
where 𝑓!" is an indicator variable for fixation on the ith attribute of the jth item, with 𝑖 ∈ {𝑑, 𝑠} and 𝑗 ∈ 1,2  and 𝜃 between 0 and 1 is the bias term toward the fixated option. 
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In words, this model gives full weight to the rating of the fixated attribute and item, a 
reduced weight to the fixated attribute of the non-fixated item (with the bias term fixed 
across attributes for simplicity), and no weight to the non-fixated attribute. When the 
consumer is looking at a given item, the RDV changes according to: 
𝑉!!! = 𝑉! + 𝜇! 𝑟!! − 𝜃 𝑟!! , current fix = 𝑑!−𝜇! 𝑟!! − 𝜃 𝑟!! , current fix = 𝑑!𝜇! 𝑟!! − 𝜃 𝑟!! , current fix = 𝑠!−𝜇! 𝑟!! − 𝜃 𝑟!! , current fix = 𝑠! + 𝑁(0,𝜎!)      (3)   
where 𝑉! is the value of the RDV at time t and 𝜎! is the variance. Note that there may be 
other possible functional forms for the value of the RDV. Here we use the above model as 
a starting point to derive qualitative predictions, with the idea that potential refinements can 
be made in the future. 
 
With respect to the fixation process, we adopt the same treatment of fixation lengths as in 
the basic model in Krajbich et al. (2010), sampling from an empirical distribution of first 
and middle fixations instead of attempting to model fixation length explicitly. We also 
condition the fixation distributions on the fixated attribute, as it is natural to suppose that 
fixation lengths may be different for different attributes. The order of fixations, however, is 
more complex in the multi-attribute case. We have four distinct fixation locations and three 
possible transitions from one fixation to the next (with four possible transitions for the first 
fixation). For the first fixation, as in the basic model, we simply use an empirical 
distribution of first fixation locations. For subsequent fixation patterns, we could assume 
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that the transition process is an exogenous Markov chain with given probabilities for a 
next transition conditional on the current fixation location. However, empirical data shows 
that transitions occur in more complex ways, so we take the transition process to be 
exogenous but conditional on the entire past history of fixations for that trial. For example, 
the probability of transitioning from d1 to s1 changes based on the pattern of fixations up to 
that point. In order to avoid sparse search patterns in the data, after the sixth fixation, we 
conditioned the search tree only on the location of the immediately previous fixation.  
 
We thus have a four-parameter model with (𝜃, 𝜇! , 𝜇!,𝜎!) that we can simulate using the 
Bayesian updating procedure described above. Note that as we have a low number of trials 
per subject and thus relatively high variation across subjects, our data is not particularly 
well suited to fitting this type of model. Instead, we simulate the model based on plausible 
parameter values of 𝜃, 𝜇! , 𝜇!,𝜎! = (0.6, 0.0001, 0.00001, 0.015). In simulated runs, 
the RDV generally moved toward the fixated item, but the slope depended on the values of 
the designs and sizes (Fig. 1c, d). For example, the RDV signal integrated toward the right 
item barrier when the subject fixated on the right design, even though it had a lower value 
than the left design (Fig. 1d). This suggests that, as in simple binary choice, visual fixations 
are also important for the integration process in multi-attribute binary choice. 
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Fig. 1. (c, d) Simulated runs of the model using 𝜃, 𝜇! , 𝜇!,𝜎! = 0.6, 0.0001, 0.00001, 0.015 . 
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RESULTS 
 
Basic psychometrics. As predicted by the model, the choice data indicated that items that 
were rated more highly were more likely to be chosen across both display conditions (Fig. 
2a). Note that the plot shows only design, and not size, ratings. Due to the design ratings’ 
high correlation with size ratings (see Supplementary Materials), size ratings were excluded 
in the relevant figures to avoid dominance.  
 
A logit regression of differences in poster and size ratings on choice shows that choices are 
a logistic function of the ratings and size in both conditions (design coefficient = 1.29, p = 
0.0002 for C1; 2.02, p = 0.0000 for C2; size coefficient = 0.27, p = 0.052 for C1, 0.54, p = 
0.0002 for C2; Fig. 2b). There were no significant differences between C1 and C2 in poster 
design (p=0.053) or size ratings (p=0.14). Within conditions, however, the difference 
between poster and size rating effect was highly significant (p = 0.0026 for C1 and p = 
0.0000 for C2), suggesting subjects place more weight on poster design compared to size. 
 
We also examined response time and number of fixations per trial. Response time was 
correlated with difficulty, or the difference in poster design ratings (linear regression 
coefficient = -537.9, p = 0.0019 for C1, and -475.7, p = 0.0001 for C2, respectively; Fig. 
2c), and there were no significant differences between the two conditions (p = 0.75). The 
same was true of the number of fixations per trial (linear regression coefficient = -0.46, p = 
0.0047 for C1, and -0.47, p = 0.0001 for C2, respectively; p-value between C1 and C2 = 
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0.95; Fig. 2d). This correlation between both response time and number of fixations and 
difficulty is a common property of drift-diffusion models. 
 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Choice curve as a function of the difference in poster design ratings.  
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Fig. 2. (b) Logit regression coefficients of choice vs. constant and differences in poster 
design and size ratings. (c) Response time as a function of the difference in poster design 
ratings. 
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Fig. 2. (d) Number of fixations as a function of the difference in poster design ratings.  
 
  
  
124 
Choice biases. The differential impact of display on search seen in the data is important 
because search impacts value integration and thus choice. The attentional DDM also 
predicts that the decision process should show several choice biases. First, the model 
predicts a last-fixation bias: subject should be more likely to choose an item if their last 
fixation is to that item, a result of the fact that the value of the non-fixated item is 
discounted. As predicted, we find that the last fixation exhibits a choice bias towards the 
last fixation location (logit regression slope = 0.58, p = 0.0064 for C1, 1.26, p = 0.0001 for 
C2; Fig. 3a). There is a significant difference in the slopes of C1 and C2 (p = 0.037).  
 
Second, the model predicts that final fixations should be shorter than middle fixations since 
fixations are interrupted when a decision threshold is reached. We find that, consistent with 
the model predictions, last fixations are shorter compared to middle fixations for both 
design and size in C1, though not significantly for C2 (for design: p = 0.0016 for C1, p = 
0.29 for C2; for size: p = 0.0000 for C1, p = 0.069 for C2; Fig. 3b). In addition, there is a 
significant difference between the two conditions for last fixation duration to poster design 
(p = 0.022; Fig. 3c), but not size (p = 0.91). This result provides some evidence that the 
integration aspect only occurs during the viewing of complex stimuli, like poster designs.  
 
Finally, the model predicts that there should be a choice bias due to relative increased 
looking time for one item over the other. As predicted, Fig. 3d shows the bias in choosing 
the relatively more viewed item as a function of the rating difference (logistic regression 
slope = 0.25, p = 0.084 for C1, 0.17, p = 0.013 for C2).  
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In addition, the results show a large overall differential in attention to design vs. size––
poster designs are looked at longer than size in both conditions (p=0.0000 for C1, p=0.0000 
for C2; Fig. 3e). There are no significant differences in latencies between the two 
conditions when looking at poster design (p=0.1801) and size (p = 0.2887). This 
differential attention to designs is consistent with the larger weights that design ratings have 
in the logit regression described in Fig. 2b. 
 
 
Fig. 3. (a) Choice bias for the last fixation as a function of the difference in poster design 
ratings. 
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Fig. 3. (b) Fixation duration as a function of fixation type. (c) Choice bias for the last 
fixation to a poster as a function of the difference in poster design ratings.  
 
  
  
127 
Fig. 3. (d) Choice bias for the more viewed item as a function of the difference in poster 
design ratings. (e) Average fixation time by attribute and condition. 
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Properties of the general search process. However, the choice biases do not extend to 
the general nature of the fixation process, which is independent of underlying value. To 
rule out that our effect is simply due to subjects paying more attention to preferred items, 
we examine whether the time spent looking at items is a function of their value across all 
but the last fixation. Fig. 4a-b shows that fixation durations are independent of the value of 
the fixated design for C1 (Fig. 4a; mixed effects regression estimate: -9.8, p=0.47), though 
not for C2 (Fig. 4a; mixed effects regression estimate: 40.8, p=0.0028) and size for C1 
(Fig. 4b, mixed effects regression estimate: -1.4, p=0.93), though not for C2 (Fig. 4b, 
mixed effects regression estimate: 26.4, p=0.019). However, note that while the 
relationships for C2 are significant, they are extremely small and cannot account for the 
effect.  
 
The fixation duration does depend slightly on the difference in value between the fixated 
and non-fixated design for C2 (Fig. 4c, mixed effects regression estimate: 20.4, p=0.010), 
but not for C1 (Fig. 4c, mixed effects regression estimate: -16.8, p=0.067) and size for C2 
(Fig. 4d, mixed effects regression estimate: 19.6, p=0.053), but not for C1 (Fig. 4d, mixed 
effects regression estimate: 4.9, p=0.55), though, again, these effects are extremely small. 
Fixation duration depended more strongly on the difficulty of the decision for poster design 
in both conditions (Fig. 4e, mixed effects regression estimate: -45.5, p=0.0053 for C1; -
41.5, p=0.0096 for C2) but not for size (Fig. 4f, mixed effects regression estimate: -1.7, 
p=0.90 for C1; -11.4, p=0.52 for C2). Note that as the last fixation displays a choice bias, 
the last fixation has been discarded here. 
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Fig. 4. For middle fixations, fixation duration as a function of (a) poster rating, (b) size 
rating. 
 
  
  
130 
Fig. 4. For middle fixations, fixation duration as a function of (c) difference in design 
rating between fixated and non-fixated item, (d) difference in size rating between fixated 
and non-fixated item. 
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Fig. 4. For middle fixations, fixation duration as a function of (e) difference in design 
rating between better and worse item,  (f) difference in size rating between better and worse 
item. 
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Display configuration strongly impacts search. More striking differences between the 
two display conditions were found upon examining the search data. Fig. 5a shows the 
difference in fixation location between the two conditions as a function of fixation number. 
Poster designs are fixated earlier on in C1, and the same is true for poster sizes in C2. 
Similarly, a plot of the transitions between design and size in the two conditions suggests 
that subjects in C1 are more likely to search within the two attributes of one item before 
looking at the other item, while there is no such clear pattern for C2 (Fig. 5b).  
 
Figures 6a and 6b report fixation transition probabilities or “search trees” with branches 
trimmed to reflect only the most-traversed paths.  Search trees showing the modal search 
patterns in C1 (Fig. 6a) and C2 (Fig. 6b) show evidence for path-dependent search behavior 
that varies dramatically between conditions. In C1, over 97% of first fixations are to the 
poster design, while this is true of only 57% in C2. In C1, there is a very clear search 
pattern of design, design, size, size. In C2, however, the modal search path is much less 
clear: there appears to be a multiplicity of patterns. Figures 6c-d show the same data in a 
different format: the darker squares indicate more likely fixation patterns. While Fig. 6c 
demonstrates a clear search pattern, Fig. 6d is much more varied. The results show that 
attention appears to be driven by the latent values of stimuli and by top-down processes: 
search is not random. 
 
We see a similar, striking pattern when looking at the distribution of last fixations between 
the two display conditions (Fig. 7a). Subjects in C1 are much more likely to look at size, 
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while subjects in C2 are much more likely to look at design. Moreover, this trend is 
constant regardless of the total number of fixations in the trial (Fig. S2a-d). 
 
Fig. 5. (a) Probability of fixation to poster design as a function of fixation number. (b) 
Probability of transition to an area given current area of fixation.  
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Fig. 6. (a) Search tree displaying modal search patterns for C1. (b) Search tree 
displaying modal search patterns for C2.  
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Fig. 6. (c) Heat map of the probability of looking at the poster design first as a function 
of the probability of switching attribute category after the first fixation for C1. (d) Heat 
map of the probability of looking at the poster design first as a function of the probability of 
switching attribute category after the first fixation for C2. 
 
  
136 
Fig. 7. (a) Distribution of the last fixation by attribute and condition.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Our results provide insight into the nature of the computational processes that guide multi-
attribute, binary choice. We found evidence to support an extension of the attentional DDM 
to multi-attribute choice, in which visual fixations play a key role in the value integration 
process. In particular, we found that value-independent differences in attention impact 
multi-attribute choice. Moreover, we found that simple changes to the display impact the 
attention fixation process and thus choice, which suggests that the visual fixation process 
may play a causal role in the value integration process. This supports the results of related 
studies that have shown that manipulating attentional fixations can bias choice (Shimojo et 
al., 2003; Armel et al., 2008).  
 
It is important to emphasize that values do have an effect on the pattern of fixations. For 
example, as shown in Fig. 2c-d, the response time and number of fixations increase with 
choice difficulty. However, our display manipulation results also suggest that small 
variations in attentional fixations can affect the choice process in a significant way. C1 
might be interpreted as a more “natural” display condition, as the poster designs were 
found to be a far more significant determinant of choice than the sizes. Subjects may 
therefore have habitually expected the designs to be displayed at the top of the screen, with 
the more minor size information displayed below. This would be analogous to what we see 
in many consumer product scenarios: prices often appear underneath products, and product 
features (e.g., a car or a jewelry piece) are often listed in order of importance. The violation 
of this expectation by displaying sizes on top in C2 may have led to idiosyncratic 
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behavioral reactions by different subjects: for instance, the wide dispersion in search 
patterns that we observed.  
 
Our results have important implications for understanding and influencing choice. Our 
findings provide new insight for economic theory by demonstrating that exogenous factors 
that are uncorrelated with value, such as location, can affect the information integration 
process and, through it, choice.  As a result, systematic biases in attentional fixations could 
lead to deficits in decision-making. Modeling the visual fixation process could be used to 
better understand and correct for such deficits. Moreover, such biases have a number of 
applications in business and marketing, including store display arrangement, product 
attribute emphasis or the organization of features on a website. Higher-placed attributes for 
a given item will receive more attention and thus greater weighting in an overall value for 
the item. This explains why prices are typically much less salient in location and visual 
aspect compared to other, more attractive attributes. 
 
Further research extending our study to multi-item choice with a larger number of attributes 
would yield further insights and confirm whether the biases present in our data generalize 
to more complex settings. In addition, such an extension would be a more realistic 
approximation to the types of complex decisions that consumers actually face. In addition, 
our results do not rule out alternative models of how attentional fixations might interact 
with choice. A systematic investigation and comparison of other models is another 
important topic for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
 
Correlation between poster design and size ratings. Due to the construction of the choice 
set, the design ratings were highly negatively correlated with the size ratings (correlation = 
-0.4957, SE = 0.0073). Fig. S1 below shows a histogram of the correlation between poster 
and size ratings by subject. 
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Fig. S2 (a) Distribution of the last fixation by attribute and condition when the total 
number of fixations in the trial is 4. (b) Distribution of the last fixation by attribute and 
condition when the total number of fixations in the trial is 5.  
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Fig. S2 (c) Distribution of the last fixation by attribute and condition when the total 
number of fixations in the trial is 6. (d) Distribution of the last fixation by attribute and 
condition when the total number of fixations in the trial is 7. 
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Poster task 
In this study, we are interested in your choices between posters. There are no right or 
wrong answers; we are really interested in what you think. Art posters come in different 
sizes and can be of different kinds. In this task you will see pictures of 7 different art 
posters by well known artists. We will present you with pairs of different kinds of posters 
that are of different sizes.  
 
In a few minutes we will ask you to pick which of two poster/size combinations you would 
rather own. You will actually be mailed one of the posters based upon your choice.  We 
will pick one pair of choices that you make randomly, and send you the poster you prefer, 
so your choices will matter. First we will ask you to rate several different kinds of poster 
and sizes, then you move on to the main choices. 
 
For this study you need a screen size of at least 1000x700 pixels.  
 
When you click the button, a new window will be opened with the task. Please do not close 
the current window. After the task you will return to this window again. 
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Design rating 
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Size rating 
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Choice introduction 
Thanks for rating the sizes. 
 
On the following pages, we will present you with 30 choices between two posters of 
various sizes. You can view the poster and their sizes by moving the mouse over the boxes 
on the screen.  
You will actually be mailed one of the posters based upon your choice. We 
will pick one pair of choices that you make randomly, and send you the poster you prefer, 
so your choices will matter. 
 
Choice trial 
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Feedback screen for randomly selected choice 
 
  
 
